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Meeting: JOINT POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
Date: November 8, 1990
Day: Thursday
Time: 7:15 a.m.





MEETING REPORT OF OCTOBER 11, 1990 - APPROVAL REQUESTED.
REGIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES - JPACT POSITION - APPROVAL
REQUESTED - Mike Hoglund.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION ACT POSITION - PORTLAND URBAN AREA -
FOR REVIEW - INFORMATIONAL - Andy Cotugno.
REPORT FROM THE JPACT SUBCOMMITTEE ON METRO/TRI-MET MERGER
INFORMATIONAL - Earl Blumenauer.
*Material enclosed.
# Available at meeting.
PLEASE NOTE: Overflow parking is available at the City
Center parking locations on the attached map,
and may be validated at the meeting. Parking
on Metro premises in any space other than those
marked "Visitors" will result in towing of
vehicle.






Joint Policy Advisory Committee on
Transportation (JPACT)
Members: Chair George Van Bergen, Richard
Devlin and David Knowles, Metro Council; Bob
Bothman, ODOT; Gary Demich, WSDOT; Les White
(alt.)/ C-TRAN; Jim Cowen, Tri-Met; Ed Lind-
quist, Clackamas County; Bob Liddell, Cities
of Clackamas County; Clifford Clark, Cities
of Washington County; Bonnie Hays, Washington
County; Marge Schmunk, Cities of Multnomah
County; Pauline Anderson, Multnomah County;
Carter MacNichol (alt.), Port of Portland;
and Earl Blumenauer, City of Portland
Guests: Roger Buchanan, Metro Council; Grace
Crunican, City of Portland; Tom Vanderzanden
and Rod Sandoz, Clackamas County; Denny
Moore, ODOT; G.B. Arrington, Tri-Met; Leeanne
MacColl, League of Women Voters; Peter Fry,
CEIC; Molly O'Reilly, Citizen; Richard Ross
and Gussie McRobert (JPACT alt.), City of
Gresham; Dennis Mulvihill, Washington County;
Paul Haines, City of Lake Oswego; Margo
Nousen, Office of Senator Mark Hatfield; Gil
Mallery, Intergovernmental Resource Center;
Kim Chin, C-TRAN; and Howard Harris, DEQ
Staff: Mike Hoglund, Ethan Seltzer, Leon
Skiles, Karen Thackston, and Marilyn Konka,
Secretary
SUMMARY:
The meeting was called to order and a quorum declared by Chair
George Van Bergen. He introduced Bob Liddell, Mayor of West Linn
and JPACT representative for the Cities of Clackamas County.
MEETING REPORT





RESOLUTION NO. 90-1326 - AUTHORIZING ENTERING INTO AN INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL AGREEMENT REGARDING COORDINATION OF DECISION-MAKING FOR
THE WESTSIDE CORRIDOR AND HILLSBORO PROJECTS
G.B. Arrington explained that Resolution No. 90-1326, an inter-
governmental agreement regarding coordination of decision-making
for Westside light rail, was being requested for approval in
order to lay out the decision-making process which includes land
use decisions as well as transportation decisions. Those trans-
portation decisions are appealable through the land use process.
The agreement has been through planning and legal staff of local
jurisdictions, as well as through LCDC and the Attorney General's
office. The procedure would include all involved jurisdictions
in any LUBA appeal.
Action Taken: It was moved and seconded to recommend approval of
Resolution No. 90-1326, authorizing entering into an intergovern-
mental agreement regarding coordination of decision-making for
the Westside Corridor and Hillsboro projects. Motion PASSED
unanimously.
REGIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Ethan Seltzer of Metro's Planning and Development Department
presented an overview of the regional goals and objectives. A
concern related to the Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) is the con-
sumption of rural residential land. Inside the UGB, a trip
behavior study shows 96 percent of trips are made by auto, with
the remaining 4 percent classified as other. Metro does not now
have a statement of regional policy relative to expansion of the
UGB nor is any UGB expansion linked to the RTP, and there is not
a consistent policy framework from which to operate.
In March 1989, policy and technical advisory committees were
formed to begin work on identifying issues. These committees,
after a number of workshops and meetings, developed a document,
Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives, now in review draft
and being looked at by the region's local jurisdictions.
Ethan emphasized five major issues which surfaced as a result of
the committees' work. These are enumerated as follows:
1. Roles - Metro does not have a mandate to do comprehensive
planning. This is the responsibility of the cities and
J.PACT
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counties. Metro's role in this process has been and is that
of a coordinator.
2. Urban Reserves - Urban reserves are those areas outside the
UGB which are identified for future urban growth provided
there is no room for growth within the UGB. With urban
reserves identified, service providers within the UGB will
be better able to identify future directions and needs.
3. Economic Activity Centers - Economic activity centers or
regional town centers are envisioned as a high density,
mixed-use environment in which jobs, housing and commercial
activity exist in close proximity. They are also envisioned
as being non-auto dependent, pedestrian friendly and transit
supportive.
4. Open Space and Amenities - These issues are considered just
as important as jobs and infrastructure in an urban area.
If an urban area is not a pleasant place to be, people will
"escape" (e.g., to the "suburbs."). Open space and ameni-
ties are necessities to ensure a high quality of life in an
urban setting.
5. Investment in Infrastructure - The Metro region has a tre-
mendous investment in the present infrastructure of our
urban area. Without a policy framework in which to operate,
we put this investment at risk by not managing our growth as
well as we might. Redevelopment and infill, creating higher
densities within the urban growth boundary, will leverage
the previous high investment already made in the current
infrastructure.
The Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (review draft) is
now in a process of regional review through early December.
There will be 10 public workshops as well as distribution of
basic information material during that time.
Mike Hoglund opened the discussion and preliminary comment period
on the goals and objectives, explaining that JPACT is one element
of the public review process. Staff prepared a draft memorandum
to the Urban Growth Management Plan Policy Advisory Committee
from TPAC and JPACT. In that memo, a number of comments were
made on specific aspects of the proposed goals and objectives.
The discussion centered on 1) the need for a longer range plan-




2) urban reserve areas. Councilor Devlin expressed a general
concern that the planning horizon was too short, even though
forecasts beyond 20 years become less and less valid. In the
discussion of urban form issues, it was anticipated that a UGB
review would take place every five years, and a review of the
defined urban reserves every 15 years.
ODOT Director Bob Bothman expressed his concern, relative to
paragraph 2.a. of the memo, that the process was flawed. Ethan
Seltzer replied that the goals and objectives are principles to
work from and that the next steps will define more specific work,
as in paragraph I.e., for example, the evaluation of alternative
land use scenarios in conjunction with alternative transportation
system plans.
Commissioner Blumenauer commented that by creating a transporta-
tion and land use work plan, local jurisdictions can budget and
plan accordingly to assist Metro's effort. More important, he
added, is the ability to really visualize what's coming in the
future.
Mayor Clifford Clark stated that the term "urban reserves"
sounded like a euphemism for the UGB, as, in example, paragraph
2.e. "delineation of urban reserves outside the urban growth
boundary will assist in planning the size of facilities near the
fringe." He summed up his comments by saying that with this
approach, we now have "a new level of uncertainty." Ethan
replied: "a better level of uncertainty."
Gary Demich of WSDOT questioned, in terms of detail, what the
impact would be on the RTP. Mike Hoglund responded that it would
make the first 20 years more detailed and up to date and the last
30 less detailed and more conceptual, while maintaining consis-
tency with the goals and objectives.
Councilor Devlin stated that, in discussion of urban reserves,
there has been no talk of expanding reserves to include the whole
area. The urban reserves are small areas.
Mike Hoglund concluded his summary of the comments by turning to
urban design. The goals stress the need for better urban design,
making transportation and land use more coordinated, e.g.,
pedestrian/bicycle access, on- and off-street parking, and
transit accessibility. Finally, Mike noted how the goals




Management Plan and the RTP. High capacity transit would also be
incorporated into the RTP.
Based on the current schedule, Mike explained that the comments
will come back before JPACT for final adoption next month.
Today's comments will be summarized and reviewed by TPAC. TPAC
will then forward their comments and recommendations to JPACT.
Commissioner Lindquist summed up by saying that the task is much
bigger than originally realized and that it is a challenge. How
do we handle growth? It must be a team effort. He voiced a
concern that a whole new layer of government of land use could
come into being and urged caution.
Mayor Clark stated that the WCTCC did not want to sign off today.
Washington County wants to enter comments and he requested a
delay until the December meeting. Blumenauer urged Clark not to
delay, but to identify areas of substantial disagreement. Ethan
added that this is not an end product and that it is important to
move the work ahead. Bob Bothman stated that he would like
something from the Transportation staff which shows the impact on
transportation.
Ethan suggested defining criteria for "under what circumstances
is an economic activity center transit supportive?" and then
JPACT can provide comments of its expectations.
Written comments are to be submitted to Andy Cotugno.
ADJOURNMENT
The meeting was adjourned.
Report written by: Marilyn Konka











Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT)
From: Andrew C. Cotugno, Transportation Director
Regarding: REGIONAL URBAN GROWTH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES; REVISED DRAFT
COMMENTS
Attached for your review is a revised draft JPACT/TPAC memorandum to
the Urban Growth Management Committee regarding the Regional Urban
Growth Goals and Objectives. The revisions contained in the memo
were developed by TPAC at their October 26, 1990 meeting and are
intended to respond to the specific concerns of JPACT as discussed
October 11. Additions to the comments are shaded and deletions
crossed out. The objective is to have a JPACT approved set of
comments ready for submittal to the Growth Management Policy Commit-
tee by November 8. However, as it was noted at the last JPACT
meeting, if and where differences remain, the comments may be
forwarded "conditionally." This not only accommodates the Growth
Management Committee's schedule, but also acknowledges the member-
ship linkage between the Committee and JPACT.
In general, JPACT was supportive of the goals and objectives as
discussed at the October 11 meeting. The main concerns pertained
primarily to the overall or cumulative effect the goals and objec-
tives may have on the transportation system or on transportation
planning in general. More specifically, JPACT identified three
major issue areas: the impact of the goals and objectives on the
transportation system; the concept of urban reserves; and the
concept of a long-term planning horizon. To address these concerns,
TPAC has recommended additional language be included in the comments
suggesting follow-up activities early in the process which better
define and evaluate for their transportation and other impacts the
concepts of "activity centers," "urban reserves," and "infill/
redevelopment." Language is also recommended to coordinate land use
and transportation planning work program development so that
potentially significant conflicts can, again, be identified as early
in the process as possible.
JPACT IS REQUESTED TO APPROVE THE REVISED DRAFT COMMENTS ON THE
REGIONAL URBAN GROWTH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR SUBMITTAL TO THE












Urban Growth Management Plan Policy Advisory Committee
From:
Regarding:
Transportation Policy Alternatives Committee (TPAC)
Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT)
REGIONAL URBAN GROWTH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
We have reviewed your draft document proposing Regional Urban Growth
Goals and Objectives and congratulate you on your considerable
progress in defining an urban growth strategy for the Portland
region. This document will provide a helpful framework for guiding
and coordinating local and regional plans— §j|j| The proposals in thi3
document will have a significant effect on tfie Regional Transporta-
tion Plan (RTP)T and He look forward to working with you to finalize
and implement these recommendations, we feel it is particularly
important to coordinate your work program development and follow-up
studies with our regional transportation planning
The following are comments on specific aspects of the proposed goals
and objectives:
1. The goals and objectives define a policy framework for urban
growth which must ultimately be implemented through a geo-
graphic concept plan delineating the urban growth pattern for
the region. It is important that Metro, its growth management
and transportation committees and interested jurisdictions,
agencies and the public continue to participate in this urban
growth management program, leading to more specific products in
activities
in general we understand the document does not represent a plan
rather it defines a set of principles we offer our support to a
process moving in the right direction yet realize more work needs
to be done in particular we support the intent of the goals and
objectives to direct the region toward three major concepts involv-
ing activity centers urban reserves and infill-redevelop-
ment this direction serves to implement the land use principles
defined in the rtp regarding urban con ai ment and concentrating
land uses in a transit supportive pattern t ese proposals need to
be further defi ed and their p ten ial impacts and interrelation
ships ad quately evaluated as part f the foll w-up process again
we look forward to working with you on these foll w-up a tivities




the future. Based upon the Draft document, we see the impor-
tance of the following activities:
a. evaluation of potential urban reserve areas outside the
UGB;
b. evaluation of the feasibility of and density for infill
and redevelopment within the urban growth boundary;
c. identification of planned economic activity centers and
proposed development requirements inside and outside these
centers-?- with, an emphasis on examining the relationship
between objectives for infill-redevelopment versus ojec-
tives for economic activity centers
d. identification of natural areas proposed for protection;
e. evaluation of alternative land use scenarios in conjunc-
tion with alternative transportation system plans— should
be achieved early in the process through the coordination
of the urban growth management and transportation planning
Based upon these studies, an urban growth concept plan should
be developed and adopted.
JPACT, TPAC and the Metro Transportation Department look
forward to assisting and actively participating in the aspects
of these studies having transportation implications, particu-
larly the evaluation of alternative land use/transportation
scenarios. We will ensure that the next Regional Transporta-
tion Plan update is coordinated with your efforts.
2. A number of land use recommendations appear to be very good in
terms of their potential benefits to transportation planning:
a. Establishment of a series of economic activity centers
appears to be a very good concept in that it provides a
basis for integrating development with major transit nodes
and provides sufficient density to encourage pedestrian
circulation and use of alternative access modes. the
concept is consistent with rtp recommendations for re-
gional high density sub-centers focused on regional tran
sit trunk route stops and major transit centers* We would
like to further evaluate the implication of this proposal
work programs*




on the full transportation system, including highway
access, parking, ridesharing, transit system design and
internal circulation.
b. There should be a stronger emphasis on restricting multi-
family housing to economic activity centers and designated
transit zones.
c. There should be a stronger emphasis on restricting Class A
office and regional retail development to economic activ-
ity centers.
d. In general, infill and redevelopment results in more cost-
effective infrastructure investments, depending upon the
specific type and density of development.
e. Delineation of urban reserves outside the urban growth
boundary will assist in planning the size of facilities
near the fringe.
f. Consideration of a longer term planning horizon (such as
50 years) is helpful and should be pursued both inside and
outside the boundary. This is particularly important for
evaluating the long term viability of LRT and for defining
requirements for right-of-way dedication.
3. The proposed objectives on urban design relating to a better
land use relationship to transit, pedestrians and bikes is very
important to successfully integrating land use and transporta-
tion. More attention is needed to develop good urban design
techniques that are applicable in high density environments
such as economic activity centers as well as lower density
neighborhood environments.
4. Transportation Policy 3.2 needs to be restructured. As pro-
posed in the Draft document, it deals with directing new
development first into areas already having needed transporta-
tion systems, second into other parts of the region that can
meet mobility needs without new construction and last into
areas requiring new or expanded transportation systems. This
may be a desirable policy for controlling and directing growth
but is misplaced as a transportation policy.
As an alternative, this policy could establish that the overall
long range transportation plan should first seek to meet




mobility objectives without new construction before proposing
new facilities be added to the RTP.
5. Objective 2, dealing with the provision of public facilities
and services, should explicitly include transportation.
6. Objective 2 should establish the policy that public infrastruc-
ture investments be used to help implement the desired urban
form expressed in these goals and objectives.
7. In order to better integrate land use plans with the Regional
Transportation Plan, consideration should be given to coordi-
nating the schedule for periodic reviews in the Portland
region.
8. We encourage you to include ODOT and Tri-Met on your technical
and policy committees.
METRO Memorandum
2000 S. W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398
503/221-1646
Date: November 8, 1990
To: Urban Growth Management Plan Policy Advisory Committee
From: Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT)
Regarding: REGIONAL URBAN GROWTH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
We have reviewed your draft document proposing Regional Urban Growth
Goals and Objectives and congratulate you on your considerable
progress in defining an urban growth strategy for the Portland
region. This document will provide a helpful framework for guiding
and coordinating local and regional plans and will have a signifi-
cant effect on the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP). We look
forward to working with you to finalize and implement these recom-
mendations. We feel it is particularly important to coordinate your
work program development and follow-up studies with our regional
transportation planning activities.
In general, we understand the document does not represent a plan;
rather, it defines a set of principles. We offer our support to a
process moving in the right direction, yet realize more work needs
to be done. In particular, we support the intent of the goals and
objectives to direct the region toward three major concepts involv-
ing "activity centers," "urban reserves," and "infill/redevelop-
ment." These proposals need to be further defined and their poten-
tial impacts and interrelationships adequately evaluated as part of
the follow-up process. Again, we look forward to working with you
on these follow-up activities.
The following are comments on specific aspects of the proposed goals
and objectives:
1. The goals and objectives define a policy framework for urban
growth which must ultimately be implemented through a geo-
graphic concept plan delineating the urban growth pattern for
the region. It is important that Metro, its growth management
and transportation committees and interested jurisdictions,
agencies and the public continue to participate in this urban
growth management program, leading to more specific products in
the future. Based upon the Draft document, we see the impor-
tance of the following activities:




a. evaluation.of potential urban reserve areas outside the
UGB;
b. evaluation of the feasibility of and density for infill
and redevelopment within the urban growth boundary;
c. identification of planned economic activity centers and
proposed development requirements inside and outside these
centers with an emphasis on examining the relationship
between objectives for infill/redevelopment versus objec-
tives for economic activity centers.
d. identification of natural areas proposed for protection;
e. evaluation of alternative land use scenarios in conjunc-
tion with alternative transportation system plans should
be achieved early in the process through the coordination
of the Urban Growth Management and Transportation Planning
work programs.
Based upon these studies, an urban growth concept plan.should
be developed and adopted.
JPACT, TPAC and the Metro Transportation Department look
forward to assisting and actively participating in the aspects
of these studies having transportation implications, particu-
larly the evaluation of alternative land use/transportation
scenarios. We will ensure that the next Regional Transporta-
tion Plan update is coordinated with your efforts.
2. A number of land use recommendations appear to be very good in
terms of their potential benefits to transportation planning:
a. Establishment of a series of economic activity centers
appears to be a very good concept in that it provides a
basis for integrating development with major transit nodes
and provides sufficient density to encourage pedestrian
circulation and use of alternative access modes. The
concept is consistent with RTP recommendations for re-
gional high density sub-centers focused on regional tran-
sit trunk route stops and major transit centers. We would
like to further evaluate the implication of this proposal




on the full transportation system, including highway
access, parking, ridesharing, transit system design and
internal circulation.
b. There should be a stronger emphasis on restricting multi-
family housing to economic activity centers and designated
transit zones.
c. There should be a stronger emphasis on restricting Class A
office and regional retail development to economic activ-
ity centers.
d. In general, infill and redevelopment results in more cost-
effective infrastructure investments, depending upon the
specific type and density of development.
e. Delineation of urban reserves outside the urban growth
boundary will assist in planning the size of facilities
near the fringe.
f. Consideration of a longer term planning horizon (such as
50 years) is helpful and should be pursued both inside and
outside the boundary. This is particularly important for
evaluating the long term viability of LRT and for defining
requirements for right-of-way dedication.
3. The proposed objectives on urban design relating to a better
land use relationship to transit, pedestrians and bikes are
very important to successfully integrating land use and trans-
portation. More attention is needed to develop good urban
design techniques that are applicable in high density environ-
ments such as economic activity centers as well as lower
density neighborhood environments.
4. Transportation Policy 3.2 needs to be restructured. As pro-
posed in the Draft document, it deals with directing new
development first into areas already having needed transporta-
tion systems, second into other parts of the region that can
meet mobility needs without new construction and last into
areas requiring new or expanded transportation systems. This
may be a desirable policy for controlling and directing growth
but is misplaced as a transportation policy.
As an alternative, this policy could establish that the overall
long range transportation plan should first seek to meet




mobility objectives without new construction before proposing
new facilities be added to the RTP.
5. Objective 2, dealing with the provision of public facilities
and services, should explicitly include transportation.
6. Objective 2 should establish the policy that public infrastruc-
ture investments be used to help implement the desired urban
form expressed in these goals and objectives.
7. In order to better integrate land use plans with the Regional
Transportation Plan, consideration should be given to coordi-
nating the schedule for periodic reviews in the Portland
region.
8. We encourage you to include ODOT and Tri-Met on your technical
and policy committees.
METRO




Date: October 29, 1990
To: JPACT
From: pAndrew C. Cotugno, Transportation Director
Re: Surface Transportation Act Reauthorization
FHWA and UMTA have released legislative proposals for their
respective components of the Surface Transportation Act. These
are in the process of review by the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation and the Office of Management and Budget. A Draft
bill is expected to be submitted to Congress in February, 1991.
Attached is an overview of the key elements of the FHWA and UMTA
proposals (more details are available upon request), together
with an evaluation of the implication of the proposal to urban
areas and a recommendation for adopting a position.
ODOT has initiated an effort to establish a statewide position
through the participation of statewide interest groups.
JPACT IS REQUESTED TO REVIEW THIS PROPOSED POSITION AND PROVIDE
GUIDANCE ON THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN
THE STATEWIDE EFFORT. IN DECEMBER/JANUARY, AFTER THE ODOT EFFORT






FHWA Legislative Proposal Highlights
A. NHS Program
1. A National Highway System (NHS) category is proposed,
representing a consolidation of the previous categories
for "Interstate" and the "major" "Primary" routes (3.5
percent of the total public road miles). 50-70 percent








$8.29 b. $8.65 b.
2. NHS funding will be distributed to the states. The
states will select improvements on the NHS routes in
cooperation with local officials through the MPO's.
3. Fund flexibility for alternatives to upgrading the NHS
route will be limited to operational improvements to
parallel arterials, HOV lanes on the NHS route, and park-
and-ride lots.
4. Match ratio will be 90 percent for operational and
rehabilitation-type improvements; 75 percent for other
capital improvements; 60 percent for start-up costs of
traffic management and control systems; 35 percent on
toll facilities.
By comparison, the basic existing federal share is 90
percent for Interstate and 75 percent for Primary. Both
the new and the old STA increase these federal shares if
the state contains a large amount of federal lands. In
Oregon, the revised shares are currently 92 percent and
88 percent, respectively, and would be higher than the
basic rates under the new STA.
5. The Interstate system will be retained and signed for the
motorist. NHS funds can be used to build or upgrade
additional routes which can be signed as Interstate
routes if they meet Interstate standards and connect with
the Interstate system.
6. Use of NHS funds on beltways or bypasses in areas over
200,000 population will be for improvements designed to
ultimately provide for multi-lane divided highways with
separate lanes for through traffic and with access
limited to interchanges with other NHS routes.
7. NHS funding would be used for high-speed, intercity rail
studies, use of highway rights-of-way and highway design
modifications.
8. Set-aside within the NHS category will be created for
discretionary funding of high cost, large scale, access-
controlled projects on the Interstate system or routes
directly connected to the Interstate system. Funding
will be paid back as a loan through future years appro-
priation.
9. Funds will be distributed 70 percent on the basis of fuel
consumption and 30 percent total public road mileage. By
comparison, current Interstate-4R funds are distributed
on the basis of Interstate lane miles (55%) and Inter-
state vehicle miles traveled (45%); current Primary funds
are distributed on the basis of rural population (22%),
urban population (33%), rural area (22%) and rural mail
delivery routes (22%).
The effect is to shift the distribution away from one
which emphasizes the geographic size of the state to one
which emphasizes the population size of the state (at
Oregon's detriment).
B. Urban Program
1. An "Urban/Rural Program" is proposed representing a
consolidation of the "minor" portion of the "Primary"
system, the FAU system plus all other Collector routes
not currently on the FAU system and, in the rural areas,
the FAS system.
2. Funding for the Urban/Rural program would be more than
double the existing FAU/FAS level.
Current Proposed
STA STA
FAU $0.75 b. $0 b.
FAS 0.6 0
Urban/Rural _0 3.3
$1.35 b. $3.3 b.
3. Flexibility for use on transit allowed (although transit
improvements on NHS routes not clear).
4. Federal project approvals and inspections would be re-
placed with overall program approval. EIS requirements
would still apply.
5. 60/40 match ratio.
6. Funding distributed to each state based upon what they
paid in; funds available until spent.
C. Bridge Program
1. Revised formula approach for funding distribution to
states would remain with NHS, off-system and other (i.e.,
FAU system and FAS system) set-asides; set-aside shares
not defined; formula basis unclear.
2. "Discretionary" Bridge program expanded to all facilities
except off-system (i.e., allows FAU bridges).
3. Minimum threshold for Discretionary funding — $10 mil-
lion for NHS and $5 million for other routes.
4. Discretionary funding requires toll feasibility analysis;
criteria not defined.
5. 75/25 match ratio.
D. Additional Requirements
1. Pavement Management System required for NHS system by the
states.
2. Bridge Management System required for NHS and all other
systems for which bridge funds will be used (i.e., all
bridges).
3. Congestion Management Plan required in urban areas
greater than 200,000 population by the states in
cooperation with MPO's.
4. Safety Management System required for the NHS system by
the states.
4UMTA Program Highlights
1. Revised overall program funding level as follows:
Current Proposed
STA STA
General Fund $2.3 b. $1.8-1.48 b.
Gas Tax. . . 1.4 2.2-3.2
$3.7 b. $4.0-4.68 b.
This increase is accomplished through a draw-down of the
trust fund surplus rather than a gas tax increase.
2. Funding for discretionary versus formula programs is proposed
to be reversed with discretionary funded from the General
Fund rather than the gas tax (as provided by the current STA)
and vice versa. This provides greater assurance for formula
funds, responds to the objections of some rural states that
they pay gas taxes but never receive discretionary funding
and leaves New Starts exposed to future budget cuts because
of the General Fund source of revenue.
3. Changes Rail Modernization program from current distribution
to eight old rail cities to all rail cities.
4. Funding for New Starts = $500 million per year without
separate category for Washington, D.C. Metro (current = $400
million plus $100 million Washington, D.C. Metro).
5. Urban program equivalent to current urban Section 9 plus Rail
Modernization; Rural program equivalent to current Section 9
(small city), Section 18 (rural) and Section 16(b)(2) (pri-
vate, nonprofit). Section 16(b)(2) program in urban areas
unclear.
6. Changes the federal share from 75 percent to 60 percent.
7. Eliminates use of Section 9 funding for operating assistance
but allows an expanded definition of "Materials and Supplies"
under the capital program.
8. Allows flexibility to use transit formula for highways.
9. Retains current recipients in areas over 200,000 population;




5Evaluation of Legislative Proposals
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation report to
Congress, "The Status of the National's Highways and Bridges:
Conditions and Performance," 40 percent of the needs nationwide
are for Modernization improvements in the metropolitan areas. In
addition, 16 percent are for Interstate Rehabilitation, a portion
of which are in the metropolitan areas. The FHWA/UMTA legisla-
tive proposals do not ensure these needs will be met nor that an
equitable share of the funds will be targeted to the metropolitan
areas. Furthermore, the proposals provide insufficient flexi-
bility and will inherently bias funding decisions against proj-
ects that can most cost-effectively meet urban mobility objec-
tives .
The FHWA/UMTA proposals continue the past trend of disinvesting
in the urban areas, emphasizing intercity highway improvements
and skewing funding that does flow to urban areas toward major
highway improvements. Particular concerns are as follows:
A. Urban Mobility Not Adequately addressed:
1. The major funding categories to meet Urban Mobility
objectives are either through NHS program or UMTA-New
Starts program. The NHS program will receive 5 0-70
percent of all the FHWA funding (@ $8+ billion) while the
New Starts program will continue at a meager $.5 billion.
a. NHS provides bias toward major highways without ade-
quate flexibility for alternatives involving upgrading
parallel arterials, bus service expansion, rail
construction or demand management even if these will
more cost-effectively meet NHS congestion objectives.
b. New Start funding inadequate to meet legitimate demand
for New Start facilities. The overall funding level
is increased $100 million/year but will also include
Washington, D.C. Metro. In addition, shifting the New
Start program from the gas tax to the General Fund
puts this funding level in jeopardy.
c. NHS funding to states for both urban and intercity im-
provements reinforce bias for intercity improvements
at the expense of urban mobility improvements. Since
the Rural NHS is intended to connect all urban areas
of population greater than 10,000, urban vs. rural
competition will be significant.
d. Level of NHS funding intended for urban areas not
necessarily targeted to urban areas. The level of
funding is based upon the overall NHS needs (urban and
rural) but the distribution is not targeted.
e. Match ratio bias in favor of NHS improvements (75/25)
rather than urban arterials (60/40) or New Starts
(60/40) .
2. The Urban program (FHWA and UMTA) which is intended to
meet the balance of the urban system needs is insuffi-
cient to meet urban needs. "Urban" funding would be
spread across a larger system. FAU system would be
expanded with more large scale facilities shifted from
the FAP system and added smaller facilities (all
Collector routes).
3. Added requirements that urban areas implement Congestion
Management Plans are not accompanied with resources and
flexibility to meet requirements.
4. The FHWA/UMTA programs should be restructured to ensure a
balanced approach to meeting key national objectives
affecting:
a. Urban/suburban growth and gridlock
b. Urban air quality
c. International economic competitiveness
B. Intercity Improvements Partially Satisfied
1. The philosophy of NHS for intercity connections appears
acceptable (involving connecting all urban areas of
10,000 population or greater) but should not be the
priority at the expense of urban mobility.
2. An artificial mileage cap (150,000 miles) could limit in-
tended function of NHS, but all mileage levels under
consideration (120,000 to 180,000) represent a signifi-
cant increase over the Interstate system (44,000 miles).
3. Preservation of the Interstate system could be jeopar-
dized by shifting funds to Preservation and Modernization
on a much larger NHS system.
Recommendation
A. Principles
1. Urban areas should be assured funding through a formula
approach to the greatest extent possible.
2. A federal Discretionary program for NHS and New Starts
should be provided to supplement formula programs for
large scale, high-cost projects.
3. Funding available to urban areas should be sufficiently
flexible to meet objectives through the most cost-
effective alternative available. Modal bias resulting
from funding availability, match ratios or difference in
administrative requirements should be eliminated.
4. Comprehensive Congestion Management requirements should
be a joint responsibility of the state and urban area,
including the state Department of Transportation, MPO,
cities, counties and transit operators, and should be the
primary basis for targeting funds to urban mobility
needs. Congestion management requirements should apply
to UMTA programs in addition to FHWA.
B. Proposed Changes to FHWA/UMTA Proposals
1. Designate NHS system in urban areas only for the purpose
of defining a congestion management requirement for fa-
cilities of national significance (NHS routes into and
through urban areas) rather than for targeting funds for
NHS improvements.
2. Standardize match ratios at 75/25.
3. Increase funding for New Start program with reliable
trust fund dollars.
4. Retain "New Starts" and NHS "Discretionary" programs for
high-cost, large scale projects.
5. Maintain Bridge program.
C. Alternatives for Distributing Funds to Meet Urban Mobility
Objectives
Alternative 1
Maintain "NHS" and "Urban" categories as currently
proposed.
Suballocate urban portion of "NHS" funds to urban areas.
Allow use of the urban NHS allocation for preservation
projects on the NHS system identified by the state.
Allow use of the urban NHS allocation for actions iden-
tified by the state and the region in the Congestion
8Management Plan to meet level-of-service objectives on
the NHS system. Allow sufficient flexibility to fund
highway, transit, arterial or demand management im-
provements that most cost-effectively benefit the NHS
route.
Suballocate FHWA "Urban" funds and UMTA "Urban" funds to
each urban area to meet mobility objectives off the NHS
system. Allow use of highway funds for transit; transit
funds for highways.
Alternative 2
Maintain an Interstate-Preservation category to be admin-
istered by the state in both urban and rural areas.
Merge the funding intended for NHS "Urban" Modernization
with the FHWA "Urban" program and the UMTA "Urban" pro-
gram into a single category with suballocations to each
urban area.
Allow first priority use of the consolidated "Urban"
funding program for cost-effective actions identified by
the state and the region in the Congestion Management
Plan to meet level-of-service objectives on the NHS
system.
Allow use of the consolidated "Urban" funding program on
mobility improvements off the NHS system if reasonable







































































































Enclosed please find Metro's detailed route list for
the Portland region's urban area Highways of National
Significance (HNS) system. As requested by the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) , the route list has been
entered on the enclosed diskette. For your reference,
we have also included a hard copy of the route list and
a map which details individual route segments. The
routes remain unchanged from our initial submittal and
reflect the basic and second level mileages allocated
to the region. The list does not include any optional
level facilities.
With this submission, the Portland region's responsi-
bilities related to the initial development of an HNS
system for "illustrative purposes" are complete. We
appreciate the assistance you and your staff have
provided us during this exercise and are extremely
interested in its outcome. We anticipate, given the
uncertainties surrounding the HNS and its development
process, additional work will be required on the pro-
gram prior to adoption of a new Surface Transportation
Act (STA) .
Specifically, the Portland region's HNS system was
reviewed and approved for submission, with comments and
concerns, by the region's Joint Policy Advisory Commit-
tee on Transportation (JPACT). Those comments are sum-
marized in a September 13, 1990 letter to Bob Bothman
from George Van Bergen, JPACT Chair. A copy of that
letter is attached for inclusion as part of our submis-
sion. Also, after reviewing the preliminary statewide
urban and rural networks as distributed September 25 by





1. Optional Level Facilities
The urban area systems for different parts of the
state appear odd relative to their application of
"optional mileage levels." While the Portland
region has not identified any optional facilities,
the other urban areas, to varying degrees, have.
While we understand that the Portland region has
been allocated the bulk of the "basic" and "second"
level urban mileages, and while we understand the
difficulties the other urban areas encountered in
developing a coordinated, comprehensive system, we
feel the optional mileages should be used judi-
ciously and only as a means to create equitable
systems between the urban areas. This does not
currently appear to be the case. As it stands now,
a number of relatively minor street segments have
been designated for the optional level in the
state's other urban areas. Consequently, the re-
sulting system does not appear equitable based on
any criteria or formula, whether lane-miles, popu-
lation, fuel consumption or others.
Accordingly, we feel that the optional level street
segments should at least be applied uniformly
throughout the state and be consistent with FHWA
HNS national significance criteria which are in-
tended to:
. Serve interstate and international commerce and
travel;
. Provide for national defense needs;
. Enhance economic vitality and international
competitiveness;
. Provide service to all portions of the nation; or
. Respond to changing population and travel
patterns over time through an objective review
process.
Also, for further clarification, we feel that ODOT
should develop necessary statewide criteria for
optional level facilities. Such criteria will
enable the state to define a consistent, logical,




is ultimately adopted as part of the new STA. Such
a system would also reduce the potential for future
funding allocation discrepancies between the
state's urban areas. Possible criteria could in-
clude functional classifications, current federal
designation (Interstate, Primary, etc.), average
daily traffic, land use, economic factors, and
others.
In summary, the application of statewide HNS clas-
sification criteria should result in comparable
systems between the state's urban areas. Individ-,
ual urban facilities should be able to be reviewed
for HNS inclusion whether they are in Portland,
Eugene, Salem, or Medford.
2. U.S. 26 (Sunset Highway)
U.S. 26 (the Sunset Highway) should be included in
the Basic Level System in its entirety from down-
town Portland to U.S. 101. In addition to its
importance as a key highway facility within the
Portland metropolitan area, the Sunset Highway
provides a major connection between the Portland
area and the coast. This connection is vital from
two major economic standpoints: commerce and tour-
ism. With its connections to the Sunset Corridor
and downtown Portland, we feel the Sunset Highway
is consistent with the HNS significance criteria by
"serving international commerce and travel," "en-
hancing economic vitality and international compet-
itiveness," and "responding to changing population
and travel patterns."
We felt the Sunset Highway's exclusion from the
Access Oregon Highway program and as a Statewide
route in the Oregon Highway Plan was a mistake and
we do not want the same mistake repeated in the
event the HNS program is implemented at the "Basic"
mileage level. Further, if the state continues to
recommend second level HNS status for the Sunset
Highway, we would appreciate receiving from ODOT
quantifiable justification for such a designation
as compared to other routes that are included in
the Basic system.
Again, we have appreciated working with you and your




We would appreciate hearing back from you on our above
comments as soon as possible in order for these issues
to be resolved in advance of the November 30, 1990 FHWA
submittal deadline. If you have questions or would
like to meet to discuss our comments or our proposed
system for the Portland region, please feel free to
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Mr. Robert Bothman, Director
Oregon Department of Transportation
Transportation Building, Room 135
Salem, Oregon 97310
Dear Bob:
In accordance with the directive from FHWA, we have sub-
mitted a preliminary "Highways of National Significance"
system for the Portland metropolitan area (within the
Federal-Aid Urban boundary). We are, however, concerned
about designating such a system without fully understand-
ing how the Surface Transportation Act will use such a
system.
As currently proposed by FHWA, urban areas will not be
properly equipped to deal with the growing problem of
urban gridlock. This-proposal puts the urban areas in the
position of competing for funds statewide for improvements
to their national highways even if alternative transit or
arterial improvements are shown to be more cost-effective.
Furthermore, there is no assurance that the state will
choose to fund the requested national highway improvement
or spend their funding elsewhere in the state.
Consideration should be given to other alternative
approaches for the Surface Transportation Act. Urban
mobility should be recognized as the primary objective in
urban areas, not building national highways. In addition,
urban areas should be given certainty as. to the level of
funding that will be provided to their area with suffi-
cient flexibility to implement the transportation system
most appropriate for their area.
More detailed comments, which have been approved by TPAC
and JPACT, are attached. Also attached are comments re-
ceived from Citizens for Better Transit. We look forward
to your support in pursuing these issues with FHWA and
Congress. We request that you transmit these comments to
FHWA with the submittal of the Highways of National Sig-
nificance. We have submitted the map and the detailed
listing to Mr. Royer under separate cover.
Sincere
"George van Bergen, Chaf?





Comments on FHWA Proposal
for a System of
"Highways of National Significance"
1. The national interest in the metropolitan areas throughout
the country should be based, upon a comprehensive approach to
the area, taking into consideration the land use objectives
of the area, a need to attain a certain level of urban mo-
bility, and the already recognized interest in air quality.
The national interest is not to build a highway system of
national significance. Achieving a desired level of mobility
in an urban setting requires a comprehensive mix of highway,
arterial, transit, bike and pedestrian improvements in con-
junction with the transportation demand management and effec-
tive land use planning.
The current FHWA proposal does not assure that the desired
level of mobility will be accomplished. Rather, it assures
that certain segments of "national highways" will be improved
or added and it continues a funding bias in favor of these
national highways at the expense of other modes, particularly
in light of UMTA's proposal to reduce the federal share for
transit funding to 60 percent.
2. The FHWA proposal for development of "Congestion Management
Plans" in the urban areas is a good step in the right direc-
tion. It demonstrates that FHWA understands the importance
of a comprehensive set of actions to meet a minimum level-of-
service standard on the national highways. However, as pro-
posed, the majority of funding to be provided through the
Surface Transportation Act will be made available to the
states to build and improve the Highways of National Signif-
icance while the localities are left with the requirement to
implement the balance of the Congestion Management Plan with
insufficient funding. Greater emphasis should be placed on
providing funds to implement the full Congestion Management
Plan rather than just the elements associated with improve-
ments to the Highways of National Significance.
3. The preliminary map submitted for the Portland metropolitan
area only reflects planned routes to the extent these routes
are reflected in approved environmental documents. In par-
ticular, the following routes are reflected on the map:
a. Extension of Marine Drive west of N. Portland Road.
b. Connection of McLoughlin Boulevard to 1-5 at the east end
of the Marquam Bridge.
c. Connection of Bertha Boulevard to 1-5.
If a program is established based upon a system of Highways
of National Significance, provision should be made for adding
-2-
new routes to the system once the planning and project de-
velopment process determines the need for these routes. The
following new routes are under consideration in the Portland
metropolitan area but are not reflected on the map:
a. The Mt. Hood Parkway from 1-84 to U.S. 26.
b. The Sunrise Corridor from 1-205 to Highway 224 in the
vicinity of SE 135th Avenue,
c. The Western Bypass between" 1-5 and the Sunset Highway.
If these are ultimately approved, it would be appropriate to
add them to the system of Highways of National Significance.
The FHWA proposal for apportionment of funding to each state,
based 70 percent on each state's share of total highway use
of motor fuel, simply rewards those states that make the
least effort to conserve^energy. The more a state pursues an
energy-efficient transportation system with greater emphasis
on transit, bikes and walking, the more that state will be









- D R A F T -
Datei November 7, 1990
To: The Metro/Tri-Met Merger Subcommittee
From: Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT)
Re: Metro/Tri-Met Merger Report
Attached for your consideration is JPACT's report on the
transportation planning and transit service implications of a
Metro/Tri-Met merger. While time did not permit an exhaustive
study of this question, the attached report does represent the







Letters on these topics from individual JPACT members are
included as well as documentation on the experience in other
metropolitan areas.
JPACT strongly recommends approaching the question of transit
governance based upon the region's objectives for transit service
improvement. Upon defining the transit system improvements, the
question of how to best implement the system, finance the system
and govern the system would be appropriate. JPACT would be
willing to participate in such an effort if a reasonable work




TRI-MET/METROPOLITAN SERVICE DISTRICT MERGER
NOVEMBER 8, 1990
CITY OF
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
Earl Blumenauer, Commissioner





Attached for review is your Committee's report on the proposed Metro/Tri-Met merger.
I can assure you that we took this charge seriously. We believe the focus of this
discussion should be on better transit service for the region. As JPACT representatives,
we are dealing with much more than simply highways and public transit. Our decisions
effect the livability of our neighborhoods, how the region grows and how robust that
growth will be.
When METRO asked JPACT to respond to the transportation planning and transit service
implications, we had only a little over a month to accomplish that task (see attached
Metro resolution). Given the short time frame and lack of staff availability, we
accomplished what we could. Many important questions remain to be answered. Those
are identified in the report.
While the Committee summarizes a number of findings in the report, I will not repeat
them in this transmittal letter. The conclusions of the Committee are as follows:
1. The consideration of Tri-Met merger should be delayed until the fall of 1991 after
the completion of negotiations for the Westside light Rail full funding agreement.
2. The Metro merger committee should work with JPACT to develop a reasonable
work plan for a merger study.
3. The work plan should include:
a. the identification of a problem;
b. the study process;
c. the identification of the region's goals for transit;
d. development of alternatives and review criteria;
e. involvement of public and affected jurisdictions;




JPACT should recognize the efforts of the members of the Committee. They include Jim
Cowen, Bob Bothman, Clifford Clark, George Van Bergen, David Knowles, Bonnie Hays,




JPACT Committee on Tri-Met/Metro Merger
BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF THE
METROPOLITAN SERVICE DISTRICT
SUPPORTING THE MERGER OF TRI-MET ) RESOLUTION NO, 90-1293A
WITH THE METROPOLITAN SERVICE )
DISTRICT AND ESTABLISHING A PROCESS ) Introduced by Rena Cusma,
TO PURSUE THE MERGER ) Executive Officer and the
) Intergovernmental Relations
) Committee
WHEREAS, The Metropolitan Service District under Oregon
Revised Statutes Chapter 268.370 is granted the authority to merge
with the transit system of the mass transit district, which for the
Portland Metropolitan region is the Tri-County Metropolitan
Transportation District of Oregon (Tri-Met); and
WHEREAS, The District believes the merger of Tri-Met would
benefit the citizens of the mass transit district by providing
directly elected representation through the Council of the
Metropolitan Service District and the Executive Officer, potential
economies of scale and cost savings from consolidation, and greater
public accountability; and
WHEREAS, In order to pursue a merger of Tri-Met with the
District, a process must be established to develop comprehensive
information on potential costs and benefits of a merger, to actively
involve representatives of all interested parties, and to prepare
specific actions to remove impediments to a merger; and,
WHEREAS, The Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation
(JPACT) has been established to provide recommendations to the
District on transportation policy matters; now, therefore,
BE IT RESOLVED,
1. That the Council of the Metropolitan Service District
supports the concept of a merger of the Tri-County Transportation
District of Oregon with the Metropolitan Service District and
establishes a subcommittee of the Council Intergovernmental Relations
Committee with membership and charge as outlined in Exhibit A hereto
to pursue the merger.
2. That the Council of the Metropolitan Service District
requests that JPACT, as a forum of local elected officials and
transportation operating agencies, conduct a study of the
transportation planning and transit service implications of a merger
and report to the Council Intergovernmental Relations Committee no
later than October 31, 1990.
ADOPTED by the Council of the Metropolitan Service District
this 12th day of July, 1990.
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JPACT COMMITTEE REPORT
TRI-MET/METROPOLITAN SERVICE DISTRICT MERGER
NOVEMBER 8, 1990
INTRODUCTION
In July 1990, the Council of the Metropolitan Service District (MSD) adopted a resolution
supporting the merger of Tri-Met with MSD and establishing a process to pursue the merger
as part of that process.
The MSD Council requested the Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT),
as a forum of local elected officials and transportation operating agencies, conduct a study
of the transportation planning and transit service implications of a merger and report to the
Council Intergovernmental Relations Committee on October 31, 1990. That date has since
been moved to November 13, 1990.
The JPACT Chair, George Van Bergen, subsequently asked Portland City Commissioner, Earl
Blumenauer, to Chair a Committee to conduct the study. The following JPACT members
agreed to serve on the Committee: Jim Cowen (Tri-Met), Bob Bothman (ODOT), Clifford
Clark (Cities of Washington Co.), George Van Bergen (JPACT Chair), David Knowles (Metro
Council), and Bonnie Hays (Washington Co.). The Chair also invited Charlie Williamson and
John Frewing to serve on the Committee. Both individuals are former Metro Councilors and
JPACT members.
The Committee met and identified issues to be addressed in the study effort. Those issues
are the following: (1) Problem Definition, (2) Process/Timing, (3) Finance, (4) Service, (5)
Planning, and (6) Governance. The content of this report is directed to those subject areas.
I- PROBLEM DEFINITION
The Committee is concerned that Metro is proposing a significant, disruptive change
in the regional transportation service delivery system without identifying a "problem"
necessitating the change.
The Metro Council adopted a resolution which states, The District believes the merger
of Tri-Met would benefit the citizens of the mass transit district by providing directly
elected representation through the Council of the Metropolitan Service District and the
Executive Officer, potential economies of scale and cost savings from consolidation,
and greater accountability."
The Committee thinks Metro has drawn a premature conclusion that has not been
tested or demonstrated.
"it ain't broke. We do not perceive Tri-Met or the region's transit service delivery as
currently broken. While there is always room for improvement, Tri-Met was recently
named the best large transit agency in North America. Tri-Met's popularity is currently
high according to public opinion polls and the agency is currently working on the
Westside LRT which is important to all of us in the region." (Source: Clackamas
County)
MWe believe that before substantial changes are made, there should be a compelling
reason for change. That reason may exist, but we have yet to see the establishment
of a case that change needs to be made in the method that mass transit is managed
and governed in the metropolitan area." (Source: Bob Woodell, Port of Portland)
There are public policy questions which could form the basis for a significant analysis
of regional transit service delivery. Is the public concerned about the current Tri-Met
governance structure? Does the public think accountability would be improved by
moving the governance of this service to Metro? At what price? What is the Oregon
experience regarding the effectiveness of single purpose special districts? Are the
regional objectives for transit service delivery being met by Tri-Met? Should Tri-Met
expand its customer base to meet suburban demands? Is it easier to raise financing
in a single purpose district versus multi-purpose district? Should mechanisms other
then a Metro/Tri-Met merger be evaluated to improve local service delivery?
Those are only a few of the questions which should be addressed to the public and
public jurisdictions before the Metro Council draws the conclusion that regional transit
services would be improved by a transfer of responsibilities to Metro.
FINDINGS
This committee finds that the Metro Council has not identified a problem to be solved, nor
demonstrated how a proposed merger would benefit the region, and the current review process
does not provide an appropriate examination of the issues.
H- PROCESS/TIMING
Committee members have serious concerns about the process and timing of this review
as conducted by the Metro Council. In attempting to secure a Westside Light Rail
Funding Agreement with the Federal Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) prior
to September 30, 1991, we must appreciate the fact that we are competing nationally
with at least ten other communities for a portion of very limited dollars. Experience has
taught us that we must singularly focus on our federal objective to succeed. UMTA
demands clarity regarding institutional arrangements for funding and managing such
projects. Such clarity cannot exist with ongoing discussions concerning a merger.
"With respect to the merger issue, we are vitally interested in any transportation related
measures which would improve transit services and correspondingly result in air quality
attainment status and also provide for future growth. However, I have serious concerns
and questions regarding the subject study and the direction to move on this issue at
this time." (Source: Fred Hansen, Department of Environmental Quality)
The Metro Council has adopted timelines for its study and dictated timelines for the
JPACT study that allow insufficient time for a systematic and unbiased analysis."
(Source: Bonnie Hays and Clifford Clark, Washington County and Washington County
Cities)
Note: Jurisdiction comments are quoted from material included in Attachment A.
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"Between now and September 1991, gaining a full-funding agreement for the Westside
Light Rail Transit project is the region's top transportation priority. Any other
transportation topic will only cause confusion and direct damage to that goal."
(Source: Office of Transportation, City of Portland)
Thus for the next year, the jurisdictions represented on JPACT must show
unprecedented unity in our approach to the voters, and state and federal
decisionmakers. The stakes are too high to do anything less. I therefore recommend
we delay all further discussion of a merger for at least a year." (Source: Bob Bothman,
ODOT)
FINDINGS
The committee finds that an analysis of a potential merger between Tri-met and Metro
interferes with the region's top transportation priority for westside light rail and should wait until
at least the end of year 1991.
IN- FINANCING
In the near term, the Committee is concerned that a merger will cause additional costs
to be borne by Tri-Met. Looking into the future, the Committee is concerned about the
availability of adequate funding for transit services with the prospect of Metro as the
governing body. Metro has contracted with the consulting firm Cogan, Sharpe, Cogan
to examine these issues. That work will not be complete in time to be considered by
this Committee.
"In considering whether 'better' transit service can be gained 'better' needs to be
defined. If 'better' means 'more', then additional revenues are required. The current
situation suggests that Metro would not be able to provide more cash, and service
will not get better. If 'better' means a greater variety of services, this can only be
achieved by gaining a more flexible union contract....If additional revenues are not
available and there is no additional flexibility in work rules, then any significant changes
would 'threaten existing services'." (Source: Office of Transportation, City of Portland)
The primary source of operating revenue (payroll tax) is at its statutory limit. Federal
resources are in a period of decline and greater reliance on state and regional
resources will be required. State match for on-going capital replacement is no longer
available." (Source: Richard Feeney, Tri-Met)
Tri-Met reports that increased pension costs resulting from a change in pension systems
would range from $3.1 million to $6.2 million per year depending upon how employee
costs are covered and accrued medical benefits are treated. This assumes that current
Tri-Met employees transferring to PERS would include capped prior eligibility service
but would not include prior benefit service.
FINDINGS
The committee finds that it is impossible to comment on the full effects on the Tri-Met/Metro
merger until the full costs of the merger are identified, and a revenue source identified to pay
tibe costs. However, the committee is most concerned that jurisdictions, the public, Metro and
Tri-Met have the opportunity to engage in a public dialogue regarding plans for financing transit
into the next century.
IV. SERVICE
The attached report, "Regional Transportation Decision Making" (Attachment B), is Tri-
Met's effort to review the development of transit service levels and patterns in the
context of regional transportation policy. The report also describes major transportation
and transit issues of the 1990's.
The report asks the question "What system of governance and inter-jurisdictional
cooperation will be most effective in achieving the level of consensus, ownership and
resolve that is necessary to address the next decade's transportation issues?
1. Will the region be able to meet the travel demand generated by downtown
Portland?
2. What level of off-peak service is necessary to meet downtown Portland growth
projections?
3. What approaches are necessary to meet a target mode split of 35% of all
downtown trips?
4. What level of service will be needed to serve the non-downtown travel market?
5. What will be the role of non-traditional fixed route service in the 1990's?
6. What will the level of Tri-Met's financial involvement be in the development of
the regional rail network?
7. What will be the desirable level of special needs transportation service, given
the American's with Disabilities Act and the eventual 100% accessibility of the
fixed route system?
8. How will the transit industry, and Tri-Met in particular, deal with eroding
productivity introduced by new federal law (i.e. Clean Air Act, Americans with
Disabilities Act and possible mandatory drug testing)?
9. How will Tri-Met and its regional partners secure the necessary capital and
operating funds for the envisioned system?
Also included for the Metro Council review is a report by the City of Portland, entitled
"City Goals and Objectives for Transit." This report draws together transit policies
from the City's Comprehensive Plan and the Arterial Streets Classification Policy
adopted by City Council. It is a summary of the expectations of Portland residents
and businesses as adopted in City policy, and clearly illustrates the interdependent
nature of City policy implementation and the provision of transit service.
In addition, Washington County has provided a report entitled "Alternative Concepts for
Providing Transit Services." The City of Portland report and the Washington County
report are included in Attachment C.
FINDINGS
The committee finds that Metro adopted timelines for its study and dictated timelines for the
JPACT study that prohibit thorough analysis. The committee recommends that the Metro
council develop an inclusive, systematic process for examining the service implications to the
region of the proposed merger. The process should include an analysis by each jurisdiction
of current policy and future plans, as well as Tri-Met's plans to meet those expectations. The
public should be encouraged to participate so that issues of mobility, community livability and
growth would be clearly understood. Only after the completion of that process, would JPACT
have sufficient information to evaluate the service implications of such a merger.
V. PLANNING
The Committee members have differing opinions regarding the federal MPO designation
and the appropriateness of that designation in the event of a merger. Additional review
would be necessary to form a common point of view.
"I think the MPO role is substantially compromised if the Metro Council was also the
transit operating agency. Currently, the Metro staff plays an important watchdog role
over both Tri-Met and local governments," (Source: Clackamas County)
"It's not clear whether the merger would have any impact on METRO'S MPO
designation. Are there other transit agencies which have the MPO designation?"
(Source: Gussie McRobert, City of Gresham)
The federal regulations for MPO designation require the following:
designation by the Governor with agreement of units of general purpose local
governments;
principal elected officials of general purpose local governments to be represented
on the MPO; and
the MPO can be redesignated by agreement of 75 percent of local governments
(20 of 27) representing 90 percent of population (930,000 of 1,032,831) in
cooperation with the Governor.
The intent of federal regulations is the following:
to'directly involve transportation service providers in a coordinated fashion in the
transportation planning and decision-making process; and
to ensure a comprehensive and objective evaluation of alternative modes.
FINDINGS
The committee finds that consolidation of Tri-Met and Metro would require careful attention to
the way staff and decision-making is assigned to maintain the integrity of the MPO
responsibility. The following appears necessary, if a merger is implemented:
a) JPACT decisions on MPO functions should remain independent of responsibilities for
transit operations, decisions on transit operations and budget should be assigned to a
separate committee and the Metro council;
b) JPACT bylaws currently provide for JPACT jurisdiction over MPO decisions, this should
be retained and reinforced;
c) Tri-Met's seat on JPACT would be vacated and a new mechanism would need to be
created to assure that transit orientation is included in JPACT decision making;
d) Staff support for transportation planning should be independent and objective to allow
proper evaluation of transit/highway trade-offs;
e) MPO designation must be assigned to an agency which fully covers the geographic
area in question. Alternatives (if Metro is merged with Tri-Met) include Metro, Port of
Portland, ODOT or a new agency.
VI, GOVERNANCE
Tri-Met has provided the Committee with considerable information regarding the national
transit governance experience, Attachment D. The following points summarize that
material:
A) The research indicates that three transit boards in the country are elected-
Denver, San Francisco and Oakland. The experience of those three districts
is discouraging.
B) Organizational change has come in response to identified problems-financial
crisis, disaffection of the suburbs, a crisis of confidence with the sitting board,
or a lack of progress toward building a rail system. Tri-Met no longer fits the
profile of an agency in trouble in need of shake-up organizational change.
C) Transit systems managed by special authorities like Tri-Met are more efficient
that transit systems managed under general governmental systems like Metro.
D) There are no "models" for regional governance elsewhere which, from a
transportation perspective, deserve emulation in this region. Governance
structures in several regions which have enjoyed national recognition are in
further transition or have been dramatically altered in recent years. Structures
which work are patterned after unique regional needs and "ways of doing
business" in those regions.
E) The impact of major structural changes elsewhere, as it relates to transportation
policy making and implementation of the regional agenda, has been to
significantly stall progress while new working relationships are established.
FINDINGS
The committee finds that organization/governance is most effectively responsive to the
community when designed to address specific work goals or particular work problems in the
organization. Structures which work must be designed to meet the specific needs of the
region it serves.
Since Metro has not identified work goals or problems with Tri-Met, it is premature to talk
about appropriate organization/governance.
CONCLUSIONS
From the previous material and findings, the Committee concludes the following:
1. The consideration of a Tri-Met merger should be delayed until the fall of 1991 after
the completion of negotiations for the Westside Light Rail full funding agreement.
2. The Metro merger committee should work with JPACT to develop a reasonable work
plan for a merger study.
3. The work plan should include:
a. the identification of a problem;
b. the study process;
c. the identification of the region's goals for transit;
d. development of alternatives and review criteria;
e. involvement of public and affected jurisdictions;
f. the decision process;
g. adequate timelines.
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2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5298
RE: JPACT SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT ON THE TRI-MET/METRO MERGER
Following the November 1st JPACT subcommittee meeting, it was my understanding
that the subcommittee report would be reviewed to eliminate some
editorializing, and that it would then be submitted under a cover letter from
Commissioner Blumenauer to the full JPACT committee. In addition, it was my
understanding that a letter would be drafted by David Knowles for review by the
JPACT subcommittee outlining to the Metro Council and to JPACT the concerns
raised in our meeting regarding the essence of the report.
I do not believe the November 5th letter from David Knowles to Commissioner
Blumenauer represents the conclusions nor the agreements reached by the JPACT
subcommittee. I am pleased to report that the JPACT subcommittee agreed
unanimously that a work plan to analyze the region's (and sub-regions') transit
needs, how best those needs could be met, how they could be financed, and how
they could best be administered and implemented (governance issue) was
desirable and could easily be committed to by those members present. That
becomes the reason for a time extension. In addition, item number 5 of
Councilor Knowles' letter concerning JPACT's pledge on future legislative
action was not discussed by the JPACT subcommittee in conjunction with the
subcommittee report. While that specific recommendation may or may not have
merit, it should be discussed in more detail to fully understand the action
requested by Mr. Knowles.
I request that the subcommittee members be allowed an opportunity at JPACT to
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The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
Commissioner of Public Works
ividKnowies City of Portland •
uncMor.District 11
 1 2 2 0 S.W. Fifth Avenue
*3j535a2 Portland, Oregon 97204
/2M-2005
Dear Earl:
I have reviewed the Draft Report presented to the
JPACT Subcommittee by your staff. I attended the meeting on
November 1, 1990 and expressed my views. The Subcommittee
decided to forward the report to JPACT with a recommendation
that JPACT submit the report to the Metro Council.
I had hoped that your Committee would do the
following:
1. Acknowledge that the form of governance is a
legitimate issue within the broader discussion of how
best to provide transit services to our region.
2. Identify , at least preliminarily, the positive
and negative impacts of a merger on transit service and
planning. (This was the specific request made by the
Metro Council.)
3. Recommend that JPACT join with the Council in
a more intensive analysis of the transit service needs
of the region. The product of this analysis would be
recommendations on actions required to meet those needs
and the impact of a change in governance on transit
service.
4. Recommend that JPACT request additional time to
conduct this comprehensive analysis and establish a date
certain for completion of the study.
The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
November 5, 1990 .
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5. Recommend that JPACT members pledge not to seek
a change in Metro's statutory authority during the next
legislative session and pending the completion of the
study.
You will recall that at our first meeting, I
strongly suggested that JPACT's members should play a
constructive role in the process leading up to a merger
decision. This report does just the opposite. The report
fails to address in any substantive way the issues that the
Metro Council asked JPACT to evaluate. The report consists
largely of quotations from letters and other documents
previously submitted to JPACT and distributed to the Council.
For example, Section IV of the report, the section which
purportedly deals with the transit service implications of a
merger, is nothing more than a list of questions. Thus, the
"Findings" contained in that and other sections are largely
based upon opinion, not fact. Worse, the report begins with
the conclusion that the proposed merger is a "disruptive"
change yet fails to support that conclusion with any facts
or analysis.
I believe your committee missed an opportunity to
create a constructive dialogue with the Metro Council.
Moreover^, the Committeee report lacks substance and provides
no guidance whatever to the Council. Accordingly, I cannot
join in your committee's recommendation.
I will be out of town on November 8. Therefore, I
ask that you make my letter a part of the record when you
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This is in response to your memorandum of July 31, 199 0 in which
you request comments on the Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study. As you
know, emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons from
transportation sources represent the most significant factor
affecting our ability to meet air quality standards and
accommodate regional growth.
Currently the Portland AQMA is a non-attainment area for both CO
and ozone. With respect to the merger issue, we are vitally
interested in any transportation related measures which would
improve transit services and correspondingly result in air quality
attainment status and also provide for future growth. However, I
have serious concerns and questions regarding the subject study
and the direction to move on this issue at this time. I am
concerned that action now may have adverse impacts on the November
199 0 bond issue and divert attention from the top regional
priority of light rail expansion. Rather than JPACT trying to'
answer the questionnaire in such a short time frame, particularly
for such a critical issue, I would propose the following:
Conduct the evaluation after the Legislative session;
- In the interim, have Metro define the problem that
necessitates the merger;
Identify a reasonable forum (involve JPACT) for evaluating
the issue or problem;
Direct that forum to consider a range of options/solutions
and their respective impacts.
Again, I would like to emphasize the significance of this issue as




belief that the proposed schedule for airing this issue is not
appropriate. In my opinion, this schedule could pose serious
problems for the November bond measure and threaten our region's














TO: %iiDan Bartlett, City Manager
FROM: '< Maggie Collins, Community Development Director
RE: Proposed METRO-TriMet Merger
Attachnment B (August 30th Council Packet) pretty well outlines the major
questions that should be answered if a merger were to take place. To help
focus Council discussion, I picked three types of questions, as follows:
FUNCTION: Will a merger produce integration of public transit planning
with both local land use plans and with regional transpor-
tation planning issues, sytems and plans?
OPERATIONAL: Will a merger result in daily public transit services
that are reliable, responsive to the public's needs,
and cost-effective?
POLITICAL: Will a merger result in broad public representation and
efficient decision-making?
Is an elected decision-making body appropriate to the
most efficient functioning of a service delivery system?
None of the above questions implies poor performance by TriMet as it now
exists. All of the above questions can be localized by adding, "To
Milwaukie residents" at the end of each question.
Some of a merger's advantages now being discussed include:
— a strong mandate for elected decision-makers regarding coordi-
nated public policy to assure public transit services to the
region
— i f well structured, possible reduction of duplicatory efforts
—closer integration of public transit operations with highway
and light rail transit plans as articulated through the Regional
Transportation Plan
—mandate for integration of public transit planning with land use
planning at both the local plan level and the regional implemen-
tation level.
11
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Memo to Dan Bartlett
September 4, 1990
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Some of a merger's disadvantages now being discussed include:
—possible politicization of public transit policy at the METRO
Council level
—difficulty of running operations division with a vague regional
perspective
—uncertainty of "better" representation through a JPACT-type







George Van Bergen, Chair, JPACT
Jim Gardner, Chair, Metro/Tri-Met Merger Subcommittee
METRO
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5398
RE: PROPOSED METRO/TRI-MET MERGER
As the JPACT members representing Washington County and its cities, we have
been asked to respond to a series of questions about the proposed Metro/Tri-Met
merger. All of the questions are quite germane, but we choose not to submit
prepared answers for the reasons outlined in this letter. We are opposed to
the study and the corresponding work being done by the Metro/Tri-Met
Subcommittee.
Our concerns and opposition to the study are described in the following areas.
Impact on Westside Light Rail Pro.iect
The timing of these studies and the controversy that is sure to accompany them
threatens the region's number one transportation project in at least two ways.
First, immediately prior to the November 6, 1990 vote on the light rail bonds,
JPACT is expected to forward its findings to the Metro/Tri-Met Subcommittee
(MTS). According to their work plan, the MTS will then make a preliminary
recommendation to the Metro Intergovernmental Relations Committee (IGR) on
November 8, 1990. The debate that is sure to precede recommendations by either
group will result in headlines that will lead to uncertainty about governance
and future direction. This type of publicity is certain to undermine voter
confidence and hurt the light rail bond request.
Secondly, the election in November is not the only date where controversy about
the governance of Tri-Met could be damaging. Given their performance to date,
the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) would seize any opportunity
to stall committing to a full-funding agreement with the region prior to the
September 30, 1991 deadline. Such controversy would also be viewed as an
opportunity for representatives from other districts throughout the United
States who will try to out-maneuver Senator Hatfield and Representative AuCoin







Inadequate Research of Impact
The Metro Council has adopted timelines for its study and dictated timelines
for the JPACT study that allow insufficient time for a systematic and unbiased
analysis. Most of the JPACT work must occur over a four week period. This
expectation seriously constrains the'subcommittee's ability to seriously
consider critical issues. In contrast, the MTS will have the benefit of a
private consultant doing staff work and a longer period of time, though still
inadequate, to develop recommendations. This point was affirmed by only one
respondant to the request for proposals on this study. The one proposal was
quoted at a significantly higher cost than estimated cost. This is clearly due
to time constraints.
This work will draw staff and elected official's time from the information
dissemination to help citizens vote on the bond issue with the facts in-hand.
This is truly unacceptable. Thus, this proposed study will not get the time
and effort it deserves, and it will severely restrict efforts to inform the
public about the Light Rail Bond issue.
Intent of the Study
Given the work plan of the MTS, it is hard to see how the merger proposal is
going to receive a fair and objective review. The work plan makes it
abundantly clear that a recommendation for merger will be forthcoming. It
specifically schedules two public hearings on the "merger ordinance"
immediately following the November election.
As elected officials who have been asked to participate in the JPACT study, we
find such assumptions offensive, biased and contrary to the public interest.
Summary
From the above comments, we prefer the following recommendations:
1. The work effort proposed by the Metro Council to study the merger of
Tri-Met and Metro should be immediately stopped; and
2. The study sub-committee of JPACT should work to develop a reasonable
plan-of-study for such a merger study after September 1991 when the full
funding agreement for the Westside Light Rail is negotiated and approved;
and
3. The plan-of-study should outline at minimum:
The problem (i.e., why is the study necessary? This has yet to be
articulated)
0
 The study process
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Inadequate Research of Impact
The Metro Council has adopted timelines for its study and dictated timelines
for the JPACT study that allow insufficient time for a systematic and unbiased
analysis. Most of the JPACT work must occur over a four week period. This
expectation seriously constrains the"subcommittee's ability to seriously
consider critical issues. In contrast, the MTS will have the benefit of a
private consultant doing staff work and a longer period of time, though still
inadequate, to develop recommendations. This point was affirmed by only one
respondant to the request for proposals on this study. The one proposal was
quoted at a significantly higher cost than estimated cost. This is clearly due
to time constraints.
This work will draw staff and elected official's time from the information
dissemination to help citizens vote on the bond issue with the facts in-hand.
This is truly unacceptable. Thus, this proposed study will not get the time
and effort it deserves, and it will severely restrict efforts to inform the
public about the Light Rail Bond issue.
Intent of the Study
Given the work plan of the MTS, it is hard to see how the merger proposal is
going to receive a fair and objective review. The work plan makes it
abundantly clear that a recommendation for merger will be forthcoming. It
specifically schedules two public hearings on the "merger ordinance"
immediately following the November election.
As elected officials who have been asked to participate in the JPACT study, we
find such assumptions offensive, biased and contrary to the public interest.
Summary
From the above comments, we prefer the following recommendations:
1. The work.effort proposed by the Metro Council to study the merger of
Tri-Met and Metro should be immediately stopped; and
2. The study sub-committee of JPACT should work to develop a reasonable
plan-of-study for such a merger study after September 1991 when the full
funding agreement for the Westside Light Rail is negotiated and approved;
and
3. The plan-of-study should outline at minimum:
The problem (i.e., why is the study necessary? This has yet to be
articulated)






• Development of alternatives and review criteria (i.e., benefits and
costs)
• Involvement of public and affected jurisdictions
• The decision process
• Realistic timelines
It may be that the merger of Tri-Met and Metro is in the best interests of the
citizens of the Portland Metropolitan Area. However, until the problem is
clearly identified and an objective study process is developed, we cannot
support any further work on this topic -- including attempting to answer the
questions as outlined by staff. We stand ready to assist and fully participate
when these issues are addressed after September 30, 1991.
We are sending a copy of this letter to all Metro Council Members and hope that
we can discuss our concerns at the JPACT meeting on September 13, 1990.
Sincerely,
Bonnie Hays O ClifforrTTlark
Chairman, Board of County Commissioners Mayor, Forest Grove








- - V ^/RECEIVED SEP.1 1 1990
Port of Portland




Mr. George Van Bergen
Chair, JPACT
Metro





2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398
Dear George and Jim:
In response to your July 31, 1990, memorandum to JPACT members
regarding "JPACT Involvement In Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study," we would
like to make the following comments and observations.
First, because we are on the eve of a very important transit funding
election, we have questions about the timing of this study. It-is
also likely that there will be requests to the Legislature for
funding that will have substantial impact on mass transit in the
metropolitan area. We feel this is not the appropriate time to add
one more major issue onto the already long list of items that could
significantly impact mass transit.
We believe that before substantial changes are made, there should be
a compelling reason for chancfe. That reason may exist, but we have
yet to see the establishment of a case that change needs to be made
in the method that mass transit is managed and governed in the
metropolitan area.
Once the timing is appropriate and mass transit problems have been
articulated, we believe JPACT should discuss the issues and form an
opinion on what proper approach is in the public interest. JPACT
then should develop the proper forum for the verification of the
reality of the problems and where the discussion to find the solution
should take place. The forum should not only allow for the
discussion of solutions, but should assure that care is taken to
articulate and address any ramifications or implications from the
proposed solutions.





I hope our thoughts have provided some help or insight into the issue
that has surfaced about any proposed changes in how mass transit in
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2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5398
Dear Mr. Cotugno:
In reference to your Metro merger memo listing eight questions
this is to inform you that we will be directing our analysis of
these issues to the JPACT committee chaired by Commissioner Earl
Blumenauer and at that time a complete analysis of these issues
will be provided.
To assist your further thoughts we have the following:
1. We have long felt there not to be any advantage for the
transportation planning agency and the regional transit
agency to be one in the same. Our view on this would change
if that agency were also to be a regional road and highway
agency.
2. Closer links between regional land use planning and the
transit agency are beneficial.
3. There is no apparent promise of better transit service with
a governance change. In the absence of planned improvements
any governance changes could be threatening. We would be
interested in hearing how governance changes could avoid or
alleviate threats to transit service.
4. An increased local government stake in transit service
delivery has always been favorably viewed by Tri-Met.
5. We believe if Metro and Tri-Met were merged the MPO
designation should be reviewed.
6. The American Public Transit Association has a wealth of
information available on organizational models for the
planning and delivery of transit service. Testimony from
individual transit experts should be sought for comparative





7. Yes conflicts would be created.
8. In the absence of any analysis or plan we have no way of
knowing whether financing mechanisms would be more or less
successful.












Please provide comments to assist in defining the transportation
planning and transit service implications of a Metro/Tri-Met
merger. Your opinion on these matters, any documentation of
these issues or identification of issues that require further
investigation will be welcomed. The following is intended to
provide additional guidance to assist in focusing your comments:
1. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the regional
transportation planning agency also deliver regional transit
services?
2. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the transit
agency having a closer tie to regional land use planning?
3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under Metro's
governance structure as compared to the existing Tri-Met
governance structure? Is there a threat to existing transit
service? Are there ways to modify the governance structure
to alleviate these threats?
4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more
closely involved in transit service delivery?
5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there be
on Metro's federal MPO designation for transportation plan-
ning?
6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models
affecting regional transportation planning and transit
service delivery from elsewhere in the United States?
7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service
provider and the road and highway jurisdictions or foster
greater coordination?
8. Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council
in developing new transit financing mechanisms provide a
greater or lesser likelihood of success as compared to the
indirect participation that now exists?
As you will note above, these questions focus on the potential
impacts (pro and con) on coordination with regional transporta-
tion planning and transit service. JPACT's comments and con-
clusions will be incorporated into the work of the Metro/Tri-Met
Merger Subcommittee which is also addressing other issues affect-
ing personnel, bonds, legal impediments, boundary, etc.
PLEASE PROVIDE WRITTEN COMMENTS BY SEPTEMBER 1, 1990."
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RESPONSE TO JPACT QUESTIONS RE: TRI-MET/ METRO MERGER "
City of Portland (August 31,1990)
1. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the regional transportation
planning agency also deliver regional transit services?
At the present time, Metro is the regional transportation planning agency.
It is not the only transportation planning agency in the region, as each
local government and several agencies do their own planning. Tri-Met
currently delivers both local ar>d regional mass transportation services.
Just as with the street system, which needs iocal arterials as well as
freeways, the transit system must have both components. The question
implies that Metro will focus on the regional services. Since Tri-Met is
riirrfirrtly imrtarfunriAd. this approach would create conflict with the local
governments and with the majority of the users, who would be hurt by
any reduction of local service.
£. Are there advantages or diaadvantaQea to having the transit agency having o
closer tie to regional land use planning?
Transit planning should be more closely tied to land use planning, both
regional and local. This is so because both the arrangement or pattern of
land uses, and the ease of access from the transit line to a building's front
door, affect transit's attractiveness to potential patrons. Metro recently
argued in court that they did not do regional land use planning. Within
the last six months, that position has appeared to shift, and they are
developing a regional land use planning program. When Metro has
successfully established this program, this question can be considered.
Until that time, it is not relevant to a Metro/Tri-Met merger.
3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under Metro's governance structure
as compared to the existing Tri-Met governance-structures? Is there a threat to
existing transit service? Are there ways to modify the governance structure to
alleviate these threats?
In comparing the two governance structures, one notes that:
a. both have boards selected from a subdistrict (of relatively similar
size) so this makes no difference.
b. Metro is elected, Tri-Met appointed. The small number of elected
transit boards in the U.S. suggests that it is not generally viewed
as an effective governance structure.
c. Metro is multi-purpose, Tri-Met single purpose.
27
d. neither has a voter-approved tax base for its genera! functions.
In vunsideriiig whwlhm "b*tt«r" transit service can be gained, "Dener"
needs to be defined, if "better means "more", then additional revenues
are required. The current situation (see d. above) suggests that Metro
would not be able to provide more cash, and service will not get better. If
•better* means a greater variety of services, this can only be achieved by
gaining a more flexible union contract. K is not likely that an elected
board will be more able to achieve this flexibility than will an appointed
board.— :—- — ~ : : '
If additional revenues are not available and there Is no additional
flexibility in work rules, then any significant changes would "threaten
existing services." In establishing service, the Tri-Met board first defined
the mix of trip types they should serve: What share of service to devote to
work trips as compared to all-day transportation for those without cars?
Next, they distributed service based on the cost-effectiveness of each line
(riders/service hours, etc.). The tine ridership Is determined by
population density, concentrated employment centers, and transit .
supportive policies. They continually adjust this service distribution
based on each line's effectiveness. Given the funding and flexibility
limitations, it is hard to imagine an elected Board using a better planning
process. An elected board, however, would be more inclined to
distribute services on a population basis rather than use a planning
process based on service need.
4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more closely involved
in transit service delivery?
It would be advantageous to involve JPACT and its individual members.
In the current proposals, Metro has not included any description of
greater JPACT involvement on a regular basis. Tri-Met has asked for
JPACT consensus with their major plans (TDP etc) and individual
jurisdictions after participating in public hearings on service changes.
5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there be on Metro's
federal MPO designation for transportation planning?
Merger would not necessarily Impact the legal status of Metro as an
MPO, since the region's MPO is selected by the Governor. However,
Metro's ability to serve as the neutral meeting place, now possible since
Metro has no transportation operating/construction responsibilities,
would be greatly affected. At this time, Metro has no specific objectives
except to see the region reach agreement and move forward. Our
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congressional delegation and others have often said that this consensus
approach Is the source of our success. If Metro became the transit
operator, It could not remain neutral and could not continue to serve as
the MPO or neutral meeting place. Given that all other agencies In
JPACT are also non-neutral, it is not clear who should be the MPO.
However, since the state has the broadest responsibility, they probably
could best provide the neutral meeting ground.
6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models affecting regional
transportation planning and transit servioe delivery from elsewhere in the
United States?
As mentioned above, we are not aware of many transit agencies
governed directly by elected boards, nor of many Instances where the
MPO and the transit agency are one. Certainly both APTA and NARC
could provide statistical information and perhaps evaluations of similar
arrangements, They should also be likely to know other alternatives,
; 7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service provider and the
road and highway jurisdictions, or foster greater coordination?
The merger would not create more points of conflict, nor would it cause
fewer conflicts. Because of the loss of Metro's role as the neutral meeting
place, the regional planning function would not be perceived as neutral,
but as biased toward transit. The locals would, in reaction, be more road
oriented. This would not foster, but hinder, cooperation.
8. Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council in developing
new transit financing mechanisms provide a greater or lesser likelihood of
success as compared to the indirect participation that now exists?
The current proposal does not specify any greater JPACT direct
involvement in regional funding than currently occurs, JPACT has been
a very active player in developing transit finance mechanisms, especially
in the last three years. The Metro Council, through several members on
JPACT, has been actively involved, ft would seem that this active but not
self-serving involvement would be the most effective in persuading the
voters of the importance of transit financing.
As a final comment, it is important to mention the issue of timing in any
discussion of a Metro/Tri-Met merger. Between now and September
1991, gaining a full-funding agreement for the Westside Light Rail
29
Transit project is the region's top transportation priority. Any other
transportation topic will only cause confusion and direct damage to that
goal. Voters confused about who will be building/operating the Westside
project are less likely to be supportive of the ballot measure. The state
legislature will similarly end up addressing peripheral Issues of agency
accountability, etc. when the focus must be on the project's justification
from a state perspective. Perhaps most importantly, it will cause
confusion in Washington O.C. Our congressional delegation has
advised us to be clear, consistent and coordinated. UMTA, which is
already looking for reasons to deny 75% federal funding, could use
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2000 SW First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398
I'm replying to George Van Bergen's letter requesting comments
on the Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study. Transit is an integral factor
in the development of the Portland region, the region's ability
to accommodate future growth, and Oregon's transportation system.
The timing of any potential merger is critical to Tri-Met's efforts
to advance regional light rail. There are three \ery important
aspects to the timing issue and they are sequential:
1. The region
November.
will vote on a $125 million bond issue in
2. Between November 1990 and Summer 1991, there will be
a change in the state administration and a new state
legislature which will be asked for substantial matching
funds for the Westside Project.
3. Throughout this period and culminating no later than
September 30, 1991, a Full Funding Agreement must be
signed with UMTA for the 75 percent federal share of
the Westside Project (see enclosed letter from Senator
Mark Hatfield and Congressman Les AuCoin).
Thus, for the next year, the jurisdictions represented on JPACT
must show unprecedented unity in our approach to the voters,
and state and federal decisionmakers. The stakes are too high
to do anything less. I, therefore, recommend we delay all further
discussion of a merger for at least a year.
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Any future study should really focus, not upon the merger issue,
but upon the definition of a problem, if one exists, in transit
service in the region. Specifically, we feel that the problem
statement should be clearly identified and be broken down into
specific components.
Once the above has been accomplished, it would seem appropriate
to address the question of the proper procedure and organization
to deal with those problems. The Department of Transportation,
is especially interested in the overall picture but, more
specifically, all of the individual transportation components,
such as highways and transit in meeting the regional planning
objectives. All of the transportation-implementing agencies
obviously have a strong stake in the implementation of transit
as laid out in the Regional Transportation Plan in order that
the components for which they are responsible are satisfactorily
provided.
The final effort in the study should be to identify all of the
alternatives to address the problem which has been identified
and then to measure those various alternatives against the problem.
Will they solve the problem? Are they doable? What are the
impacts on the remainder of the transportation system and the






I strongly recommend that JPACT consider replying to the








Oregon Department of Transportation
516 Transportation Building
Salem, Oregon 9 7 310
Dear Bob:
We are writing to review action taken by both the Senate and
House Transportation Appropriations Subcommittees on the Westside
Light Rail project.
As veterans of the fight for the Banfield MAX. project, we knew
the challenge that lay ahead in securing a federal commitment on
the Banfield's Western expansion. But financing for the project,
both locally and federally, has grown even more difficult, as was
recently demonstrated in the defeat of the May ballot measure.
When we started the Preliminary Engineering on the Westside,
Portland stood virtually alone in seeking new light rail funds.
Now ten new light rail lines around the country have qualified
for Congressional appropriations this year. Clearly, our success
on the Banfield has been an inspiration not only to those in
Portland but also to many around the country.
Despite these competing national projects, we think you'will
agree that the progress that has been made on the federal level
has put the Westside project in a relative position of strength.
The amended terminus to Hillsboro, the issuance of a letter of
intent, and a full funding contract have been secured in both'the
House and Senate Transportation Appropriation bills. These are
the most significant steps yet in building this line .to its
western terminus in Hillsboro.
Funds to finish engineering studies and to acquire additional
rights of way and some construction monies, are included in the
report -accompanying the Senate Transportation Appropriations
bill* In the House report there is language to tie up some loose
ends related to the Banfield project and to the costs of the
overall system. We hope to have all these items included in the
Committee's final Conference Report.
'We feel especially pleased to have achieved this progress toward
obtaining a federal commitment that is not exceeded by any light
rail project in the country in spite of the lack of any secured
local or state funding for this project. The likelihood of an
increased local share requirement next year make the passage of




In the coining months, we look forward to continuing our work with
the region to secure a full funding contract that leverages the
most federal money to match limited resources at the local
level. In order to ensure that Westside Light Rail becomes a
reality, we encourage you to work cooperatively and expeditiously
to forge the necessary relationships with the federal regional
officials who will play an integral role in the success of this
project. • We look forward to the day when we sign the contract





Mark 0. Hatfield Les Aucoin
United States Senator Member of Congress
MOH/sop
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Washington State Duane Berentson
Department of Transportation secretary of Transportation
D stnct 4
4200 Man Street S-15
PO. Box 1709
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2000 SW First Ave.
Portland, OR 97201-5398
Dear Mr. Cotugno:
Responding to your August 2, 1990 memorandum regarding the potential merger of
Tri-Met and Metro, I have several thoughts.
1. The combining of two governmental entities can sometimes result in operating
efficiencies and/or.better service, especially if those two agencies are currently
providing a duplication of services. I do not see an extensive, or even moderate,
duplication that would be eliminated.
2. The concept that such a combination would result in reduced overhead and
administrative expenses is seldom realized. The amount of work to be done
remains constant or increases after a merger (unless significant duplication of
services is eliminated) and, therefore, the staff needed to accomplish the work is
not significantly reduced.
3. Some users of public transportation may be dissatisfied with current service,
and may believe that a change in administration, especially moving from an
appointed commission to an elected one, will result in service improvements.
While there is much to be said for the responsiveness of elected officials as
compared to those who are not, I submit that the current Metro commissioners
were elected on the basis of their stance on Metropolitan Service District issues,
not their expertise in operating a transit system, and wonder if the merger would
ultimately result in redistricting within Metro and a whole new set of issues in
upcoming elections. Perhaps a better way to achieve an elected board with broad
representation is to have the transit board be composed of a variety of local
elected officials.
4. Finally, while the desirability of combining planning and implementing agencies
makes nice theory, something is usually lost in the process. My experience has
been that the day-to-day crises associated with providing expected services soon
overrides the importance associated with good planning efforts. The regional
planning and other MSD responsibilities will diminish in priority when
compared to keeping the system running, and I don't think the Portland





These thoughts are based on my experience as a manager and reflect neither praise nor
criticism of Tri-Met or Metro, nor are they in any way an official position of the






















2000 S.W. First Avenue
 t
Portland, OR 97201-5398
SUBJECT: Proposed Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study
I have attempted to answer, from the standpoint of what is in the
best interest of the citizens of Clackamas County, each of the
questions you asked regarding the transportation planning and
transit service implications of a Metro/Tri-Met merger.
Generally, my position can be summed up by the old saying "If it
ain't broke . . ." We do not perceive Tri-Met or the region's
transit service delivery as currently broken. While there is
always room for improvement, Tri-Met was recently named the best
large transit agency in North America. Tri-Met's popularity is
currently high according to public opinion polls and the agency
is currently working on the Westside LRT which is important to
all of us in the region.
Though I am often not happy with Tri-Met's lack of attention to
this area of the region, I am not sure that a merger would help.
More importantly, this is a very inappropriate time to be
discussing such a sensitive issue, one needing long-term careful
consideration. There is nothing about a merger that can't wait;
yet continued pressure on this issue now could unnecessarily
jeopardize the upcoming MAX bond measure!
Ql. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the
regional transportation planning agency also deliver
regional transit services?
A. I see no advantage and possibly a conflict of interest in
having the MPO also responsible for delivering "regional"
transit services currently provided by Tri-Met. Just as I
see no advantage in Metro being responsible for delivering
other regional transportation services such as new road
construction and/or road maintenance as is currently
provided by ODOT and local jurisdictions.
Q2. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the transit
agency having a closer tie to regional land use
planning?
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A. Clearly, a close tie between land use and transportation
planning is desirable. Again, a Metro/Tri-Met merger could
lead to a serious conflict of interest. The strength of
the MPO role as a multi-modal planning agency simply is
compromised when the same agency assumes operational
responsibility.
Q3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under
Metro's governance structure as compared to the existing
Tri-Met governance structure? Is there a threat to
existing transit service? Are there ways to modify the
governance structure to alleviate these threats?
A. Although an "elected" Metro Council might at first seem
appealing, a deeper look reveals some serious problems. It
is true that the Tri-Met Board seems far removed from other
regional transportation providers and the scrutiny of being
elected. However, putting transit service management
responsibility at Metro seems to distance it from the very
public it should be closer to. Either local governments
ought to be added to the Tri-Met Board or JPACT should be
given much stronger responsibilities in the merger
proposal. Either of these moves would strengthen the role
of transportation providers by making them more responsible
for a range of transportation solutions.
Q4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more
closely involved in transit service delivery?
A. Having JPACT more closely involved in transit service
delivery is perhaps the most hopeful possibility presented
by a merger. At present JPACT, via its individual members,
can both plan and deliver road projects. It does not have
a similar capability with transit. Modern transportation
systems should place more transit responsibility on those
existing governments responsible for roads.
Q5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there
be on Metro's federal MPO designation for transportation
planning?
A. Again, I think the MPO role is substantially compromised if
the Metro Council was also the transit operating agency.
Currently, the Metro staff plays an important watchdog role
over both Tri-Met and local governments.
Q6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models
affecting regional transportation planning and transit
service delivery from elsewhere in the United States?
A. Before looking for another organizational model from some
other part of the country, we should first be clear in our
own minds what we want a merger to accomplish? What's
wrong with the existing situation? How will a merger
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improve regional transportation planning and transit
service delivery? Clark County's system, C-Tran, appears
to be an attractive model. They operate an excellent
system and have been enormously successful at generating
both operating and capital revenue. They have accomplished
this by providing local governments with a strong role on
their board.
Q7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service
provider and the road and highway jurisdictions or foster
greater coordination?
A. I do not see that a Metro/Tri-Met merger would necessarily
improve our current relationship with the regional transit
service provider. Clackamas County currently has
representation on both the Metro Council and the Tri-Met
Board.
Q8- Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council
in developing new 'transit financing mechanisms provide a
greater or lesser likelihood of success as compared to the
indirect participation that now exists?
A. The Metro Council is still in the process of building broad
public support. The region has generally tried to distance
itself from Metro on money measures even when Metro is the
only acceptable vehicle . . . the Convention Center. JPACT
has been and should continue taking the leadership role in
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RE: COMMENTS ON PROPOSED METRO/TRI-MET MERGER
Dear Andy,
This letter summarizes some preliminary comments on the proposed
METRO/ Tri-Met merger, for JPACT'S consideration. At this point,
specifics of the merger are not clearly defined and it is difficult
to comment conclusively on the merger issues.
In addition to the eight issues outlined in the July 31 Memo from
George Van Bergen, JPACT should be be aware of some fiscal concerns
which could arise from a merger. The Tax Supervising and
Conservation Commission gives Tri-Met high marks for its financial
and budgeting procedures; would a merger assure sound fiscal
management of transit services? Will the METRO excise tax be
applied to Tri-Met revenues (farebox and payroll taxes), as METRO
does with the Zoo? Will the excise tax reduce net revenues available
for transit operations or create higher costs for riders? Would
Tri-Met overhead charges and grant funds be effected by the excise
tax? Would METRO charge Tri-Met rent on its buildings? Would METRO
eliminate Tri-Met's finance department, perform this in-house and/or
charge Tri-Met for these services?
Briefly, here are my comments on the eight issues:
1. With a merger METRO could lose some of its current advantages as
an effective facilitator and objective regional transportation
broker. How efficiently would a merged agency work, given the
very different organizational missions and operating
responsibilities of METRO and Tri-Met?
2. Closer ties of the transit agency to local and regional land use
planning are desirable. METRO is developing regional land use
goals, many of which support better coordination of trans-
portation and land use. There are other means than the merger
for the region to tie transit services to land use.
3. Most transit boards are governed by citizen appointees, like
Tri-Met. Regional governments, where they have some control over
transit services, rely upon separate independent transit boards.
Direct control of transit services by a regional government
appears to be an untried system with no clear promise of better
transit service. Can the METRO board invest sufficient effort to
effectively operate Tri-Met? Would the merger politicize
transit service decisions? Let's examine transit organizations




4. JPACT has a very ambitious regional transit program. To make
this a reality, JPACT must form a regional/local partnership,
involving coordinated policies, actions, funding, and promotion.
JPACT does not need to be directly involved in "transit service
delivery".
5. It's not clear whether the merger would have any impact on
METRO'S MPO designation. Are there other transit agencies which
have the MPO responsibility?
6. Toronto has a high degree of regional land use and transportation
coordination with an outstanding transit system. Let's look
closely at the organization and effectiveness of their regional
government and transit commission, before making a major change
in ours.
Another region to examine is the Twin Cities area, which also has
long experience with regional government and is in the process of
planning a regional light rail system.
7. Tri-Met coordinates well with local governments (highway
providers) currently. The merger places METRO in a new day-
to-day role with local government, possibly leading to more
METRO/local conflict in transportation issues.
8. In the past, Tri-Met has effectively developed transit funding
mechanisms, which have gained regional, state, and federal
support. METRO and JPACT need to be able to provide the regional
leadership and public vision for new transit funding proposals,
not necessarily invent the mechanisms.
I look forward to further dialogue on these issues at JPACT, as the
merger proposal is clarified. I am pleased JPACT will be looking
carefully at the implications of this proposal, so that our region in
concert can continue to build an excellent transit system.
Gussie McRobert, Mayor]
JPACT Alternate, Cities of Multnomah County
Attachment: Gresham Staff Comments on Merger Issues
cc: City Council
Richard Feeney, Tri-Met















Community and Economic Development Department
Richard Ross, Transportation Planner
a***********************************
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED METRO/TRI-MET MERGER
The METRO Council has asked JPACT to conduct a study of the
transportation planning and transit service implications of the
proposed METRO merger with Tri-Met. The following staff comments
respond to the eight issues outlined in the JPACT request for
comments on the merger.
Sources of Information:
-Toronto Transit Commission, Brian Milsup, Asst. Gen. Secy.
-Metro Seattle, John Petrick, Public Affairs
-Metropolitan Council of Twin Cities, Minneapolis, Pat O'Connell,
Public Information
-American Public Transit Assn., Public Information office
-The Practice of State and Regional Planning, APA, 1986
-"Urban Transit in Canada: Integration and Innovation at its
Best", Robert Cervero, Transportation Quarterly, July 1986
-"Try Minnesota Idea: Tax-base Sharing Plan", J. Richard
Forrester, Oregonian, June 13, 1990,
1. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the regional
transportation planning agency also deliver regional transit
services?
METRO is currently respected as an independent, objective agency
which facilitates regional guidance and consensus through the JPACT
and RTP process. Placing Tri-Met under direct METRO control could
reduce METRO'S effectiveness and credibility as a regional
transportation broker. A merged organization could have advantages
for transit planning, since a single entity would perform regional
transit/transportation planning and transit services planning. On
the transit services side, a merged agency could work less
effectively, due to the difficulties of combining agencies
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with very diverse missions, operating responsibilities, and
clients. Tri-Met is service-oriented and responsive to daily
demands of clients. METRO is structured for research,
coordination, and policy-making, not day-to-day operations.
2. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the transit
agency having a closer tie to regional land use planning?
Since expanded transit is a key regional growth strategy, the
region would benefit from closer ties between transit service and
regional land use/transportation planning. The region does not
have a regional land use plan, other than the amalgam of everyone's
Comp Plans. Since METRO'S Regional Urban Growth Management Plan is
only in a preliminary stage, METRO'S future authority in this arena
is uncertain. If the region gives greater priority to regional
growth management, then it makes sense to bring the transit agency
under greater policy control of the regional land use plan and
METRO. The study should examine other means than the merger, to
accomplish closer policy coordination of regional land use goals
with transit.
3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under Metro's
governance structure as compared to the existing Tri-Met governance
structure? Is there a threat to existing transit service? Are
there ways to modify the governance structure to alleviate these
threats?
There is no clear evidence that regional governments provide
"better transit service" than separate transit agencies. Most
regional governments exercise little control over transit services.
Regional transit systems in North America are commonly governed by
appointed boards like Tri-Met.
From limited research, the Tri-Met/METRO merger is unprecedented.
Two of the most respected regional governments in North America,
Twin Cities and Toronto, rely upon independent transit boards
appointed by, but not merged with; the regional government. Few
regional governments have a structure or powers similar to METRO;
these governments have varied degrees of control over transit
services. A thorough survey of similar regional governments should
be included in the JPACT/METRO study (see below #6).
The merger could diffuse the efforts of the METRO council and
management. With a wide mix of responsibilities, the METRO Council
could spread itself too thin to effectively tackle the new transit
operational issues it would face. Also, transit service decisions
by the METRO Council could become more subject to political
factors, than decisions by an appointed board. If the merger
proceeds, the METRO Council should consider creating a separate
transit board to govern transit planning and operations, with
policy and budget oversight by the Metro Council.
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4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more
closely involved in transit service delivery?
If the region's ambitious transit program is to succeed, JPACT must
become more involved in developing a transit-oriented future for
the region, not the details of transit service delivery. To make
enhanced transit service work, all JPACT entities need to
participate in a regional strategy to support transit usage:
cooperative transportation and land use actions by local and state
agencies, specialized transit services and other incentives for
transit use, and promotional activities. The proposed merger is
not the only means for JPACT to do this.
5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there be
on Metro's federal MPO designation for transportation planning?
We are not aware that the federal MPO designation would be effected
by the the merger. In two of five urbanized areas, state highway
or transportation departments are designated to perform the MPO
role. The merger committee needs to research whether any regional
transit agencies are also the MPO and how well this works.
6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models
affecting regional transportation planning and transit service
delivery from elsewhere in the United States?
The inquiry needs to look at organizational models from Canada as
well. Metro Toronto is the oldest metropolitan government in North
America (1953); the Toronto region has achieved high coordination
of land use and transportation with an exemplary transit system,
something the Portland region aspires to. For example, Metro
Toronto (the regional government) has a regional growth plan that
focuses development in Regional Town Centres served by a rail
transit network. Toronto transit has the highest modal split and
one of the highest farebox recovery ratios (70%) in North America.
The Metro Toronto Council has 28 elected councilors and 6 who are
Mayors of constituent cities. Metro Toronto, supported by a
unified regional tax base, has direct responsibility for the
region's major roads, waste disposal, ambulance services, welfare,
daycare, senior housing, and Metro parks. Indirectly, Metro
Toronto oversees, appoints, and sets budgets for commissions
responsible for police, transit, exhibition-performing arts,
licensing, and the zoo.
The Toronto Transit Commission is an independent 5-member
commission chartered by Metro Toronto, currently composed of five
Metro Toronto councilors. While the Commission reports to the
Metro Council, TTC is a separate entity and controls its day-to-day
operations. The separate commission, according to TTC management,
provides needed autonomy, more focus on transit, and
less-politicised decisions, than if the TTC were merged with the
Metro Council. Mergers have been proposed and rejected in recent
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years. Additionally, a regional Joint Technical Planning Committee
of the Metro Council, TTC, and local jurisdictions coordinates both
transportation and land use planning.
Another model to examine is the Metropolitan Council of the Twin
Cities. The Twin Cities Council is a 16-member group, appointed by
the Governor and legislature, which does overall planning for all
regional services, and reviews all local planning under a Regional
Development Framework (growth management plan). The Development
Framework focuses growth and capital investment into designated
growth centers; the region has a pooled regional tax base, based on
40% of the assessed value of new commercial-industrial development,
which is dedicated to funding regional services (including transit)
and some local revenue sharing.
The Council appoints separate boards to provide regional services
in transit, water quality, parks, and airports. The Council
approves policies and budgets of these agencies. The Regional
Transit Board, an independent 11-member citizen board with
geographic representation based on Council districts, plans and
administers transit services. While there have been past proposals
to merge the Transit Board with the Council, Twin Cities has opted
for separation between regional policy/planning and regional
transit planning/administration.
Seattle has a more typical agency doing regional transportation
planning, the strictly advisory/coordinating Puget Sound Council of
Governments. "Metro Seattle", the King Co. transit and sewer
agency, is run by a 41-member Council composed of elected local and
sewer district officials. There is currently a proposal to merge
"Metro Seattle" with King Co., which could go to the voters in
November. Similar proposals have been rejected in the past.
7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service
provider and the road and highway jurisdictions or foster greater
coordination?
There is currently extensive coordination between Tri-Met and
highway jurisdictions (including local governments) in transit
service planning and operations, and capital facilities. A merger
per se does not foster more transit-highway coordination, except
perhaps on a policy level. If a merger gives METRO di rect control
over transit services, METRO will have a new daily relation with
local and state government. This relation could engender more
potential local/METRO conflict, especially as METRO'S regional
powers or services grow.
8. Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council in
developing new transit financing mechanisms provide a greater or
lesser likelihood of success as compared to the indirect
participation that now exists?
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Greater regional and state involvement in new transit financing
mechanisms is desirable. Participation of JPACT and METRO in
crafting these mechanisms is not essential to their success. With
its more specialized focus and knowledge of the transit industry,
Tri-Met could just as effectively bring successful proposals to the
region's table, as it has done in the past. A question which needs
examination is how effectively METRO (versus a separate transit
agency) could pursue the public-private coventures proposed by the
Public-Private Task Force on Transit Finance. Many transit
agencies are successfully using joint development strategies to
enhance regional land use goals and transit revenues; Tri-Met is
beginning to do this with Project Breakeven. We are not aware of







Su TriMet Merger to METRO
I disagree with the draft report of the JPACT committee as
forwarded recently by Felica Trader. I have several comments
below which I would like to have considered or, if you will not
have another meeting of the JPACT committee, attached to the
report as a dissenting minority. I do want to have another
meeting to attempt to do justice to this very serious subject.
1. I don't think we have to find some "problem" in order to
consider a TriMet merger to METRO. The proper question is
whether we, the Portland area, can do things better than today.
The fact that TriMet recently won a national award should-not-—
diminish our interest in providing better transportation services
at lower total cost.
2. I think that much of current transit planning is based on
capturing real estate development opportunities rather than
providing transit service to today's residents and workers. I
believe a TriMet merger to METRO may open up some opportunities
to better integrate transit planning with regional land use in a
way that doesn't make transit a captive of real estate
development interests and highway construction interests.
3. The draft report does not even try to answer the specific
question I asked to be addressed at the last (and only) meeting,
namely, 'how many transit districts have boards appointed by
elected bodies, as distinguished from directly elected boards
which is the information which TriMet brought to the JPACT
committee?'
4. Felica's draft report simply quotes in large part from the
untested assertions of several interests opposed to a TriMet
merger to METRO. Maybe the METRO initial conclusion is wrong,
but we haven't seen any analysis that proves that. What is the
rush to complete this study? METRO has relaxed their time
requirements; we should give the issue the thorough evaluation it
deserves. A TriMet merger to METRO may represent a power threat
to some existing government bureaucracies, but our job is to
evaluate the best way of providing transit service to the
community — a TriMet merger to METRO was seen as the best
eventual way to provide transit when METRO was formed as
evidenced by the express authority given to METRO by the
legislation creating METRO.
Please advise me of the next meeting time/place and ask Felica or
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REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DECISION MAKING
Introduction .
The way in which regional transportation policies are currently
formulated and executed has become an item of discussion. Much
is at stake because it impacts the very essence of a regional
transportation consensus that has evolved over years, has
resulted in a call for a balanced transportation system, and is
widely owned not only by participating local government
jurisdictions but several levels of government as well. To alter
that very complicated, and rational set of relationships,
suggests the need to move with great care. A new way of "doing
business" could impact the regional community at many levels:
the users of the transportation system, land use patterns and air
quality, and the vitality of the regional economy. To that end,
we are dealing with more than simply highways and public transit.
Transportation infrastructure decisions will likely determine how
the region grows and even more telling, how robust that growth
will be.
An orderly discussion of the issues and proposed organizational
alterations invites us to step back and seek answers to many
questions. Some of the most important and basic questions might
include the following:
o How did the current transportation policy making system
emerge? Does it continue to work?
o What problems did the policy making structure, which can be
traced to the mid-70's, seek to solve? Do those conditions
still exist?
o How did Tri-Met's service policy develop over the years?
o How does our public transit system compare to other
properties in terms of quality and quantity of service?
o What does our history and experience suggest about
transportation policy making and governance?
o What transportation decision making structures best equip
the region to solve the issues that will lead to the
development of a balanced transportation system?
The materials which follow attempt to provide perspective and
focus to those discussions.
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I. History
This paper reviews the development of transit service levels and
patterns in the context of regional transportation policy. The
extent that transit service has responded to the regional
consensus on transportation priorities is assessed.
Tri-Met has had to respond to service issues of regional
significance (e.g., light rail, bus trunklines) as well as
interests of local significance (e.g., service to a senior center
or local employment center)« There is a constant need to balance
the complex service allocation decision: peak vs. off-peak;
weekday vs. weekend; downtown vs. non-downtown; residential vs.
employment; urban vs. suburban; frequency vs. coverage; transit
dependent vs. choice rider; riders vs. non-riders.
Tri-Metfs system-wide service concept (or philosophy) reflects
regional transportation policy. Tri-Met is a multi-destinational
transit system that is designed to attract a broad ridership
base. In this way, Tri-Met is able to respond to the multiple
goals that our regional partners have given us.
At a more detailed level, service allocation decisions are made
as the result of a detailed analysis of effectiveness measures
(e.g., rides per hour). Service is periodically adjusted as a
result of this continual monitoring process. Service is
allocated based on patronage potential and on the basis of
meeting adopted goals. It is not allocated based on payroll tax
collected in each jurisdiction or on the basis of each
jurisdiction's population. .
Five periods of transit development in the Portland region are
presented. Each is tied to a set of goals adopted by the Tri-Met
Board. The goals are compared to regional transportation policy;
in some cases, a change in regional policy resulted in a change
in Tri-Met's policy. The ability of Tri-Met to carry out
regional policy is largely determined by the level of funding
available to operate the system. In some periods, Tri-Met was
unable to expand service because of regional, economic, and
political conditions. Overall, though, Tri-Met has been a
willing partner in regional transportation planning, and that
partnership has resulted in a region with a transit system that:
- is recognized as the best in North America;
- provides a very high level of service;
- is planning to expand LRT and bus service;
- has effective linkages with all stakeholders in the transit
system; and
- has met its regional goals.
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A. 1970 — 1974: A New Agency Created - Service Collapse is
Avoided - Environmental Concerns Take Hold
Tri-Met was created by the State legislature in 1969, a fertile
time for establishing new metropolitan agencies. In addition to
Tri-Met, there was the Metropolitan Service District, the Metro
Boundary Commission, and the Fort of Portland. These agencies
were created in response to broad-ranging statewide concerns over
the quality of the environment. Unplanned growth in suburban
areas and the decline of population and jobs in the inner city
was perceived to negatively affect the quality of life in the
Portland region. By 1970, the suburbs contained 62% of the
region's population, 44% of the employment, and 50% of the retail
sales.
The State Legislature passed the legislation that created Tri-Met
with near unanimous support. The intent was to "keep alive a
gravely sick system and if possible restore it to health" (Tri-
Met, A Year of Action, no date).
The region's official transportation plan in 1971, the Portland
Vancouver Metropolitan Area Transportation Plan (PVMATS),
proposed an extensive network of new freeways and highways to
serve the entire metropolitan area. The transit component was
not significant.
Shortly after Tri-Met began operations, the Columbia Region
Association of Governments (CRAG) developed a 1990 Public
Transportation Master Plan. The plan assumed the PVMATS freeway
network (including the Mount Hood freeway) , and developed a
system of express bus routes on the freeways, with bus lanes and
busways to avoid auto congestion. The express bus routes would
serve suburban park and ride stations and a downtown Portland
Transit Mall.
Tri-Metfs goals for FY71-74 were broadly stated (Figure 1). One
goal indicates a specific action: expanding suburban service and





1. Provide superior transit for people who depend on it and
make the service attractive so that people will switch from
using cars.
2. Provide a completely new transit service for the suburban
areas, featuring transit stations with park and ride lots
and feeder buses.
3. Relieve traffic congestion and decrease the need for
expanded roadways.
4. Help control air pollution by buying buses with exhaust
emission controls and by providing an alternative to the
automobile.
Summarized from: Tri-Met: A Year of Action, no date.
Between 1971 and 1974, Tri-Met's policy was to stabilize urban
service and rapidly expand suburban service in areas unserved and
to offer more trips on the former Blue Lines routes. In the City
of Portland, Tri-Met started new crosstown service. Annual
vehicle hours grew an average of 6% per year (from 735,000 in
FY71 to 887,000 in FY74). Originating rides per vehicle hour grew
from 20 in FY71 to 23.2 in FY74.
B. 1974-1977: Calls for a Larger Role for Transit - Expanding
Tax Revenues - Service Improvements Made
During its first few years, Tri-Met was primarily concerned with
stabilizing the existing system, expanding service in suburban
areas, and making basic improvements to the service. Meanwhile,
a significant change had occurred in regional transportation
planning. A regional consensus for a balance transportation
system was developed. Long-standing policies that called for
almost total reliance on highways to meet long-term travel needs
were reversed. The region recognized that PVMATS and the 1990
Public Transportation Master Plan were in fundamental conflict.
Transit would be the major transportation investment of the
future. Instead of a region of freeways and urban sprawl,
planners wanted a region with a strong downtown, livable urban
neighborhoods, and suburbs focused on activity nodes.
The PVMATS plan was reversed by the Governor's Task Force on
Transportation for the Portland region. Governor Tom McCall
appointed the task force, which operated as a special committee
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of CRAG. The task force brought together local elected officials
and the leaders of the transportation agencies in the region1.
The task force made a commitment to a balanced regional
transportation plan and recommended a reversal of the PVMATS plan
because of:
- concerns about suburban sprawl
- residents opposition to freeway disruption
- the 1974 energy shortage
-• public ownership of Tri-Met
The political decision .to withdraw the Mt. Hood freeway and use
the money for transit projects instead was made by the end of the
calendar year 1974.
The plan produced by the task force called for a transit system
that would carry 290,000 weekday originating rides in 1990
(compared to 84,000 in FY74) . A 10% mode split, more than twice
the actual 1990 mode split, was projected based on 2.8 million
daily person trips.
In addition to supply-side improvements for regional
transportation, the state and City of Portland took steps to
manage the demand for travel. Land use plans and policies were
revised to encourage and accommodate higher density development,
particularly in downtown Portland. Most important, the task
force developed an agreement on how they would work together to
identify and resolve issues and maintain a productive dialogue.
They made a commitment to restructure CRAG so that it could be
the permanent institutional focus for the region's transportation
decisions. That arrangement has been maintained to this day.
The 1972 Downtown Plan, which was adopted before codification of
state land use planning processes, provided a focus for public
and private investments in a revitalized core area. The Downtown
Parking and Circulation Policy, adopted in 1975, is the
transportation part of the Downtown Plan. It set a lid on the
number of parking spaces and limited the number of spaces per
•thousand square feet of office space. This policy encourages
transit use rather than auto use for trips to downtown,
particularly for work trips.
At the request of Mayor Goldschmidt, Governor McCall appointed a
new Tri-Met board with a strong mandate to begin immediate
1
 Appointed by Tom McCall, the Task Force included: Neil
Goldschmidt, Mildred Schwab (City of Portland), James Gleason, Mel
Gordon (Multnomah County) Glenn Jackson (Oregon Transportation
Commission), Gerard Drummond (Tri-Met), Rod Roth (Washington
County), Robert Schumacher (Clackamas County), William Young
(CRAG), and F. Glenn O'Dell (Port of Portland).
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revitalization and expansion of service. With representation on
CRAG, the board would be more active in regional transportation
decisions, particularly in advocating light rail service to east
Multnomah County. Tri-Met responded to the new regional
directive by improving service and by planning for the eastside
light rail line.
Tri-Met also developed a new set of goals, adopted in 1974
(Figure 2). These goals reflected the larger role that transit
was to play in regional transportation and land use planning.
The goals were ambitious and set high quantitative targets for
patronage and mode split for downtown Portland trips. They also
responded to state interest in mobility for the elderly and
disabled and supported Tri-Met's active involvement in land use
planning.
The goals also referenced a set of adopted service standards that
set forth Tri-Met's criteria for evaluating existing services.
Between FY74 and FY78, annual vehicle hours of service increased
by 15% per year, ridership by the same.
Figure 2
1974 Goals
Provide efficient, convenient, safe service throughout the
Tri-County area in accordance with adopted service standards
to provide:
- basic service to those without cars
attractive and convenient alternative to the automobile
Increase ridership from 72,500 originating rides in FY74 to




reduce highway expansion needs
Increase the downtown Portland transit mode split from 18%
to 36% in 1979 to:
- reduce congestion and pollution
- reduce the need for long-term parking
Maintain farebox revenue at a minimum of 40% of operations
costs to:
- maintain fiscal stability
- review productivity of each line
Increase service to elderly and disabled people to:
- accessible regular service
start an "essential" special service
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6. Support land us planning to:
discourage sprawl
increase efficiency
To encourage ridership, Tri-Met offered fare discounts. Tri-Met
started a system-wide flat fare of 35 cents to encourage suburban
ridership to downtown Portland. Fareless Square also started in
1975 in response to the State Implementation Plan for Air Quality
and in support of the Downtown Plan.
C. 1977-1983: Manifest Destiny - Energy Crisis Results in
Increased Ridership - Agency Focuses on
Productivity - Region Commits to Light Rail
In response to the regional directive to help carry out state
land use plans, transportation and energy policies, Tri-Met
planned on a grand scale in support of this effort. It also
committed the agency to the Banfield LRT project,
Tri-Met continued to make improvements to the bus system, began
engineering studies for the Banfield LRT line, planning for the
Westside LRT line, and proposed scores of bus capital projects to
support the service levels envisioned for 1990.
To reflect its regional mandate, the Tri-Met board drafted a new
set of goals which were adopted in 1977 (Figure 3). These were
similar to the 1974 goals, but focused more on financial
capability and internal management. Tri-Met realized that, to
carry out its mandate, it would need more continuing tax revenues
than are available from the payroll tax.
Figure 3
1977 Goals
1. Support regional growth without major new investments in
highways by providing a transit system that is an attractive
alternative to the automobile.
2. Implement a financing program to support construction and
operation of the system through 1990.
3. Improve productivity with capital and operating investments
and sound, innovative management policies.
4. Make a major contribution to the improvement of the regional
environment and the livability of urban neighborhoods.
5. Maximize energy conservation and efficiency in the design
and operation of the transit system.
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6. Improve transit mobility for the transportation
disadvantages
7. Encourage growth patterns within the regional land use plan
which support efficient transit service.
The 1977 goals were the basis for the 1980 Transit Development
Plan (TDP). The TDP continued Tri-Met's tradition of providing
service adequate to meet the responsibility that regional
transportation policy had placed upon transit, acknowledging the
need for a new revenue source to support service increase.
The TDP projected about 160,000 weekday originating rides in
1985, the result of 40-50% increase in service levels. It also
proposed several productivity improvements: computerization of
scheduling and runcutting, part time drivers, timed-transfer
service, management information systems, self-service fare
collection, service reductions on low ridership lines, and light
rail.
In addition to a focus on increased productivity, this period saw
a shift in Tri-Metfs service allocation. More attention was
given to serving non-downtown trips. The 1970!s saw an
acceleration of the trend of suburban population growth that
first gave rise to concerns in the 60's. Now, in addition to
population, employment growth in suburban areas accelerated. New
regional shopping malls, Washington Square and Clackamas Town
Center, were opened.
Tri-Met's response was a multi-destinational service design.
Transit would attempt to tap not only the downtown Portland
segment of the regional travel market, but also the non-downtown
market* This would be made possible by continuing the service
expansion of the mid-70's and financing those improvements from a
new tax source.
In 1979 Tri-Met introduced a timed transfer system on
the Westside. Service hours increased 6.8%.
In 1981 service hours in suburban east county and
southeast Portland were increased 7.2%.
In 1982, service hours increased 9.7%, new crosstown
service was implemented.
D. 1983-1986: Recession Results in Service Reductions - Regan
Revolution - No New Taxes
In 1982, Tri-Met increased service 9.7% with the understanding
that new revenues would be forthcoming. However, economic
conditions in the region brought on by a national recession
prevented Tri-Met from adopting a new tax base for service
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expansion. It had become clear that the region would not be able
to provide a new source of operating funds to continue the
service expansion of the 70's.
After increasing service 29% in the previous period, 1977-1982,
Tri-Met was forced to reduce service 13% as a last resort, to
maintain financial stability.
Between FY83 and FY86, vehicle hours were reduced an average of
4.4% per year. Rider ship dropped 2.6% per year on average.
Annual system costs were reduced about $10 million. Cost per
vehicle hour held steady and rides per vehicle hour increased
from 21 in FY83 to 22.3 in FY86.
E. 198 6 - Present: Light Rail Opens - Fiscal Stability -
Ridership Rebounds
This final period saw a return to the preeminent role of transit
in regional transportation policy. The Eastside LRT line opened
with salubrious effects on ridership. HAX is so popular that the
regional political coalition at JPACT developed a comprehensive
transit funding package for the construction of the Westside LRT
line and for preliminary work on an East Portland-Clackamas
County line.
While there are plans for LRT expansion, it does not appear that
there are funds in hand to expand the bus system at the same
average rate as between FY71 and FY91 (6%) . The focus over the
last few years has been to provide peak capacity to match demand,
to maintain schedule reliability, and to respond to pressing
service requests in unserved areas.
Tri-Met, as a result, has not kept pace with suburban growth.
For example, during the 80's there was reduction in the service
levels in Clackamas County. The County has made the point that
Tri-Met should be more responsive to their needs. In response,
Tri-Met has given off-peak improvements to certain lines serving
Clackamas County priority for April 1991 service changes. The
proposed 1991 service changes address the most critical requests
generated by riders in the area and by the the Clackamas County
Transportation Coordinating Committee.
Tri-Met adopted a new set of goals in 1987, a decade after the
last set of goals was adopted (Figure 4). These goals emphasize





1. Achieve fiscal stability.
2. Increase productivity and flexibility of operations.
3. Attract and retain more public transportation customers.
4. Retain the existing diversity of service.
5. Develop new partnerships and identify advocacy groups.
Since light rail startup annual vehicle hours have grown roughly
1.5% per year. Ridership increased an average of 4.3% per year.
Throughout its history, the Tri-Met board has acted as a partner
in regional transportation planning, and developed goals that
reflect Tri-Met's regional mandate. The focus on partnership and
regional goals has resulted in one of the best transit systems in
the country, and one of the few with a light rail system. In the
next section, we examine how successful we have been compared to
other cities.
II. Governance and Service — The Present Situation
A. Putting Tri-Met in Perspective — Comparative Transit
Environments
Is there a prospect for better transit service under a new
governance structure compared to the existing Tri-Met governance
structure?
The data presented in Tables I-III and Graphs I-VII illustrate
that whether a board of directors is appointed or elected
provides no assurance that a good transit system—one that
attracts high ridership, has low costs and provides a high level
of service to the community—will result, and will be
accomplished in a cost-effective manner that retains public
support.
Tri-Met offers one of the highest levels of service to the
community of any transit agency in the nation. Tri-Met service
levels, ridership and costs compare favorably with cities that
have appointed boards and strong regional planning structures,
such as Minneapolis/St. Paul, cities with appointed boards and
weak regional planning structures such as Houston and Los
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Angeles, and cities with elected boards such as Denver and
Oakland-AC Transit.
Among its peers, the twenty-seven largest non-heavy rail transit
systems in the nation, Tri-Met ranks fourth in vehicle hours per
capita, fifth in demand responsive service hours per capita./ and
carries the highest percentage of work trips to downtown. Tri-
Met has low system costs per vehicle hour, ranking twenty-third
among its peers. Tri-Met is sixth in boarding rides per capita
and eleventh in boarding rides per vehicle hour, in spite of
ranking eighteenth in population density. Tri-Met is one of six
transit agencies with.a light rail system.
On a per capita basis Tri-Met offers 42% more service than Los
Angeles, Denver or Miami, 56% more service than Minneapolis or
Cincinnati, 63% more service than Dallas or the combined San
Diego systems, 71% more service than Houston, and 92% more
service than St. Louis.
These are not minor differences. To put these figures in
perspective, if Tri-Met were to offer to the community the level
of bus service that Houston, Minneapolis/St. Paul, San Diego or
Dallas offer to their communities, we would have to cancel all
weekend bus service and roughly one third of weekday service,
affecting 14 million annual bus boardings and 41 but of 74
routes.
In vehicle hours per capita, Tri-Met ranks only behind Seattle,
Pittsburgh and Milwaukie. Milwaukie is a city-only system that
serves a small, densely populated area, with a large university.
Milwaukie provides no suburban service.
Minneapolis/St. Paul, a region with what is generally considered to
be a paradigm of effective regional government, is average when it
when it comes to transit services. Compared to Portland, their
system offers 3 6% fewer service hours per capita and attracts only
6% more boarding rides per service hour, in spite of population
densities that are 18% higher than Portland's. Minneapolis offers
no demand responsive service.
Seattle Metro, the top ranking system in terms of service hours per
capita, generates roughly the same number of boarding rides per
capita as Tri-Met. Metro's service is less effective than Tri-Met's
— Tri-Met carries more rides per service hour than Seattle, and
Seattle Metro's costs per hour are 17% higher. Seattle Metro has a
farebox recovery ratio of 20%. Tri-Met's farebox recovery ratio is
25.5%. The difference between a 20% and a 25% farebox recovery
ratio is large. For Tri-Met to support a farebox recovery ratio of
20%, we would require an additional continuing revenue source
roughly equal to $5 million annually.
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Tri-Met also offers high levels of demand* responsive service. Many
agencies offer none. Since FY88 this ranking has probably improved
as dedicated revenues for demand responsive Special Needs services
have doubled.
No agency serves a greater percentage of work trips to downtown than
Tri-Met. In spite of ranking eighth in CBD employment as a
percentage of regional employment, Tri-Met ranks first in the
ability to carry commuters to and from the CBD. Tri-Met carries a
slightly higher number of suburban commuters than city commuters to
the CBD every day. Our ability to achieve this success is the
result of years of state and regional support for effective land use
planning and years of regional cooperation and support for the
Downtown Parking and Circulation Policy and the DEQ's Air Quality
Plan.
The role of Tri-Met in tying together the suburbs and central city
is, and will remain, important. Nationwide, and in the Portland
region, commuting from suburbs to the central city has been
increasing. Transit is necessary to assuring that our urban areas
are integrated economic and social entities, rather than just two
societies side by side. Transit will continue to be critical
because we cannot construct new highway facilities through areas
that are already highly developed. It will continue to have an
important role in supporting land use plans and keeping employers in
the city from moving to the suburbs. As we have seen in Orange
County and Santa Clara, California our suburban road systems do not
tolerate continued employment sprawl very well.
Tri-Met has not met the mode split to downtown goals the district
and the region set in 1975 for a variety of reasons, but we are head
and shoulders above our peers and are remain committed to meeting
peak hour demand to downtown.
Since light rail start-up, Tri-Met has increased bus service each
year nearly 1.5%. We have developed plans for Westside light rail
and a feeder bus system to support it. We have assured the City of
Portland that we are committed to meeting peak hour demand to
downtown. We have shared with the region and the state our concerns
about the lack of funds for capital equipment, particularly given
the drop in federal funds. We are presently working to identify our
ten year service and capital needs, given regional plans, and will
be going back to the state for additional revenues based on those
results soon. We have secured a new source of revenue from the
state that will add $3.5-$4 million to the district's continuing
revenue stream in a few years.
The term "better" needs to be defined. However, one conclusion is
unmistakable: through careful management, planning and inter-
jurisdictional support, Tri-Met provides a high quantity and quality
of low-cost transit service that places it among the top echelon of
transit service providers in the nation. Public opinion polls,
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which say that 60% of the public is satisfied with the amount of
service Tri-Met offers, support this conclusion.
B. The Present Transportation Policy Structure
Tri-Met has arrived where it is today by acting as a partner in a
regional transportation policy-making and planning process that was
deliberately set forth in 1975 by the Governor's Task Force on
Transportation to foster coordination and cooperation between the
officials and staffs of local governments, regional jurisdictions,
and the state. It is through the recommendations of this task
force, in their report The Cooperative Transportation Planning
Process in the Portland Metropolitan Area, that what is now called
JPACT and TPACT, were created as presently constituted, with
representation from Tri-Met, the Port and the State of Oregon as
well as the counties and the City of Portland. .
The task force recommendations were born out of a need to quickly
resolve pressing transportation questions, to move the region toward
comprehensive land use and multi-modal transportation planning, and
to coordinate the various transportation planning efforts already
underway in the region.
Some of these planning efforts were the Downtown Parking and
Circulation Study, a decision on the Mt. Hood Freeway and 1-205,
Tri-Met service improvements and park and ride planning, light rail
opportunities, the creation of the LCDC, the reorganization of the
Oregon DOT with a public transit division, the implementation of the
Clean Air Act, and the use of federal highway funds for transit
projects.
The cooperative process developed by the Task Force and agreed upon
by the region was simple in concept. First, .at a policy level, the
key transportation decision makers in the region made a commitment
to work together through a common institutional focus, CRAG.
Second, each agency agreed to shared responsibility for producing
the necessary plans. Thus Tri-Met would have responsibility for
transit planning and operations. ODOT and the counties would have
responsibility for highway and road planning and maintenance.
These features were considered by the Task Force, to be "a big step
above the usual situation in which the staff of one agency would
report to a committee made up of other agencies. Under that kind of
arrangement, some agencies perform only a review function, and the
transportation program is not viewed as theirs. The staff
relationships established in Portland assured that there would be a
common program developed by all agencies and, therefore, they would
have more commitment to the effort."
The Task Force recognized that a balanced regional transportation
plan would only emerge with the commitment it needs to succeed
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through an institutional structure that fostered consensus and
ownership. The institutional structure they recommended is known
today as JPACT.
Institutional realignment today could threaten these time-honored
and complex relationships. It would eliminate the mediator role
that Metro plays and would establish a new institutional arrangement
for regional transportation planning where the MPO would have
responsibility for transit planning and operations and would also
review the transportation plans of other jurisdictions, an
arrangement that was rej ected by the Governor' s Task Force.
The JPACT policy making structure has set the policy context under
which transit and highway transportation investment decisions have
been made for the last fifteen years. These efforts have brought
the region MAX and one of the top bus systems in the nation. The
Tri-Met board has acted as a partner in the process.
Tri-Met has been successful in keeping costs low because
productivity and cost control have been constant concerns of the
Tri-Met Board and staff. This emphasis is a reflection of the fact
that the Tri-Met board is selected to fairly represent the transit
system's taxpayers—the employers who pay the payroll tax and who,
over the years, have come to consider themselves stockholders in the
transit system. How would a new structure insure adequate
representation for the payroll taxpayer, a small percentage of the
electorate?
Given the effectiveness of the current arrangement, it is important
that proponents of any alternative demonstrate how the current
transportation policy making process would be strengthened and how
the new structure would lead to better outcomes. There is no
evidence that the current system does not provide accountability.
It is accountable to citizens and local governments in the region
through the public participation process and the involvement of the
political leadership of JPACT.
What relationship does Metro council envision it would have with the
State of Oregon, and how would the stability of this relationship be
assured in election after election?
From the beginning, the State of Oregon has assumed a vital role in
the success of Tri-Met. The state has supported Tri-Met efforts to
use vehicle for mass transit, developed supportive comprehensive
land use planning, reorganized the Oregon DOT to include public
transit. The State of Oregon has provided Tri-Met with millions in
capital funds, provided dedicated taxes for Special Needs
Transportation, making Tri-Met second only to Pittsburgh in the
amount of service dedicated to the elderly and handicapped. The
state provided one-half the local match on the Banfield project, and
committed one-half the local match on the Westside project. The
state has supported Tri-Met efforts to extend the payroll tax to the
65
self-employed, to state employees, and to schools and
municipalities. In the future, as federal operating and capital
support for transit continue to decline, support from the state for
additional resources for mass transit will become even more
critical.
Tri-Met is part of an institutional environment that has worked.
o It is the strongest arrangement for generating commitment and
cooperation among the many transportation interests in the
region.
o It is a structure that focuses on products and projects
o With Metro in a mediating and supporting role, it is a
structure that insures consensus and ownership in regional
transportation policy that is necessary for moving projects
forward quickly
o It is action oriented
o This consensus building, cooperative process in which support
and responsibility for both road and transit projects are
shared by the region in the regional transportation plan has
generated support for transit and transit solutions that,
without the support of JPACT, would probably not have found
support in the public.
This is a critical period for transportation in the region. It is
imperative that proponents of institutional change identify how the
forum for regional transportation policy making created in the 70s
have been unsuccessful, or why it is inappropriate for the issues we
face in the 90s.
III. Some Major Transportation and Transit Issues for the 1990's,
The Tri-Met Board of Directors already has begun a review of the
major transit issues which will confront the agency and the region
during the decade of the 1990's and beyond. The real question
becomes: "What system of governance and inter-jurisdictional
cooperation will be most effective in achieving the level of
consensus, ownership and resolve that is necessary to address the
next decade's transportation issues?
o Will the region be able to meet the travel demand generated by
downtown Portland?
In order to meet increasing peak period ridership to
downtown, it will be necessary to increase peak period
service and to buy additional vehicles (bus and rail).
Since peak service is the most expensive to provide,
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what agency best understands these issues and what
governance arrangement is best able to minimize the
costs and increase the efficiency of such service
expansion?
What level of off-peak service is necessary to meet downtown
Portland growth projections?
Increasing ridership in the off-peak might require
additional service in order to alleviate overcrowding.
Now the frequency of service is determined by policy*
rather than demand during the midday. It is possible
that higher ridership will require more frequent off-
peak service to meet loading standards. To whom should
such policy leadership fall?
What approaches are necessary to meet a target mode split of
35% of all downtown trips?
City and regional plans call for 35% of all regional
trips to downtown Portland to be' on transit. While
items 1 and 2 above account for passenger demand, it
might be necessary to induce ridership through
additional service improvements and/or the
implementation of policies that influence travel
decisions. These policies, which include land use and
parking prices, gasoline prices and vehicle fees are as
important in shaping travel as investments in additional
transit service or capital infrastructure and will
require concerted efforts by the state, Tri-Met and
local jurisdictions above and beyond those which respond
to demand. Purely supply side solutions to
transportation problems are limited. To enhance the
existing service, and to ensure continued growth in mode
split, it will be necessary to manage the demand side of
the equation more effectively. What governmental
arrangements are best suited to make these choices?
What level of service will be needed to serve the non-downtown
travel market?
This market segment is difficult to serve effectively
with transit. Expectations from the public and
jurisdictions indicate that Tri-Met will continue to
receive requests to improve service in the suburbs.
What governmental arrangements are necessary to adopt
and enforce the land use controls and other regulations
necessary to make transit work in suburban areas?
What will be the role of non-traditional fixed route service in
the 1990's?
Contracted service offers an opportunity to reduce unit
operating costs and improve service in low demand
suburban areas. Answers to many of the questions listed
above will indicate the importance and possibly the
necessity of contracting service in the 1990's. This is
a delicate union-management issue. What governmental
arrangement best provides the possibility of achieving
that goal?
What will the level of Tri-Met's financial involvement be in
the development of the regional rail network?
Capital costs for LRT lines are high, and will compete
against other pressing capital needs in the region and
the district. In part, the level of capital support for
the system is determined by the level of bus service.
What governmental entities must be involved in the
dialogue for determining the level of funding for not
only transportation infrastructure development but also
the mix between highways and transit?
What will be the desirable level of special needs
transportation service, given the American's with Disabilities
Act and the eventual 100% accessibility of the fixed route
system?
Tri-Met's SNT service is very good compared to peer
cities. Should it continue to grow at a rate
commensurate with a fixed route system, or should it be
planned independently? This is a state sponsored
program. Which units of government are best equipped to
make these decisions?
How will the transit industry, and Tri-Met in particular, deal
with eroding productivity introduced by new federal law?
The Americans with Disabilities Act, clean air legislation
and drug testing regulations will all introduce new cost
requirements on transit operations during the 1990's. A
range of responses are available in each area, each
response will impact the operating cost structure of
transit operations for decades to come. What governmental
arrangement offers the best opportunity to develop the most
effective response to these new requirements?
How will Tri-Met and its regional partners secure the necessary
capital and operating funds for the envisioned system?
The primary source of operating revenue (payroll tax) is
at its statutory limit. Federal resources are in a
period of decline and greater reliance on state and
regional resources will be required. State match for
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on-going capital replacement is no'longer available.
For years, public polls have indicated no support among
the electorate for additional taxes to increase bus
services or to operate additional light rail lines.
Development of the transit system assumes heavy front-
end as well as on-going capital replacement costs. What
inter-governmental structures and arrangements are
needed to achieve a consensus on transit funding and are






























































































METHOD OF BOARD SELECTION
APPOINTED BY COUNTY COUNCIL (7); REMAINING MEMBERS ARE ELECTED OFFICIALS FROM THE REGION.
APPOINTED BY COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.
APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONS.
APPOINTED BY GOVERNOR.
DIRECTLY ELECTED.
APPOINTED BY NY GOVERNOR.
DOES NOT HAVE AN OUTSIDE BOARD; OPERATED BY STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.
APPOINTED BY CITY (4), COUNTY COMMISSIONER (3), AND MAYORS ASSOC. (3).
APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS (3), CITY COUNCIL (5), MAYORS (2), AND BOARD ITSELF (1).
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS (5, ELECTED) SERVE AS THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.
DIRECTLY ELECTED.
APPOINTED BY CITY SUPERVISORS (5), MAYOR (2), AND CITY COMMITTEE (4).
COUNTY COMMISSION (8 DISTRICTS PLUS 1 COUNTY-WIDE REPRESENTATIVE).
APPOINTED BY REGIONAL TRANSIT BOARD.
APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONER.
APPOINTED BY CITY COUNCILS.
APPOINTED BY MAYOR (4), CITY (1), COUNTY (2); MTDB CHAIR SERVES AS 8TH EX OFFICIO MEMBER.
APPOINTED BY CITY OF HOUSTON (5), COUNTY (2), AND MAYORS OF MULTI-CITIES (2).
APPOINTED BY CITY/COUNTY OFFICIALS (5 ILLINOIS, 5 MISSOURI).
APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
APPOINTED BY COUNTY COUNCIL.
APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONER (3), AND MAYOR (2).
APPOINTED BY CITY (4), AND COUNTY (3).
APPOINTED BY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (2), CITY COUNCILS (2), AND BOARD ITSELF (1).
APPOINTED BY GOVERNOR OF EACH STATE (5 KANSAS, 5 MISSOURI).
DOES NOT HAVE AN OUTSIDE BOARD; OWNED BY STATE.
MAYORS OF 5 LARGEST CITIES IN SYSTEM REGION.









































































9 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT 35.8
10 MIAMI 34.8





16 SAN DIEGO* 26.4
17 HOUSTON 25.7
18 SANTA CLARA 24.9
19 DETROIT 19.1
20 SACRAMENTO 19.1
21 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE 18.8
22 SALT LAKE CITY 17.4
23 HARTFORD 16.4
24 INDIANAPOLIS 15.9
25 ORANGE COUNTY 15.1



















13 SAN ANTONIO 31.80
14 SACRAMENTO 31.15
15 HOUSTON 30.58
16 SAN DIEGO* 30.40





22 ORANGE COUNTY 27.30
23 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT 27.01
24 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE 25.50
25 INDIANAPOLIS 24.77
26 SALT LAKE CITY 24.28























































































































































































•INCLUDES SAN DIEGO TRANSIT SYSTEM, N. SAN DIEGO TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT, SAN DIEGO REGIONAL TRANSIT SYSTEM, AND SAN DIEGO TROLLEY.






















21 SALT LAKE CITY
22 KANSAS CITY






















































































































12 1.5 1.8 2.1
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* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego
Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit
System, and San Diego Trolley.
Source: Vehicle Hours: 1988 Section 15 Data
Service Area Population: Phone Survey, 4/90
Table II
20
BOARDING RIDES PER CAPITA



























* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego
Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit


































• Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego
Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit
System, and San Diego Trolley.


































* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego
Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit
System, and San Diego Trolley.
































• Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego
Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit
System, and San Diego Trolley.
Source: Phone Survev. 4/90
Table VI
DEMAND RESPONSIVE SERVICE AS A PERCENTAGE


































* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego
Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit
System, and San Diego Trolley.
Source: 1988 Section 15 Data
VI
TRANSIT SHARE OF HOME-BASED WORK TRIPS TO DOWNTOWN





























SAN DIEGO1 Source: Phone Survey
Tri-Met Source: May 1988 Origin/Destination Survey
ATTACHMENT C
JURISDICTION GOALS FOR TRANSIT SERVICES
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Encourage a safe, efficient metropolitan public transportation system serving
Portland as an alternative to the automobile by providing more direct cross-town
service to residential neighborhoods which connect commercial areas to other
centers of activities and employment throughout the city and the region.
Transit-related density
Reinforce the link between public transportation and land use by increasing
residential urban densities along designed major transit streets and near
commercial centers, where practical.
Transit-dependent population
Encourage a public transit system that addresses the special needs of the
transit-dependent population.
Arterial Streets Classification Policy
City-Wide Policies
Highest priority should be given to development of regional transit facilities and
"demand management" programs, consisting of ride sharing, flexible working
hours, and parking management to reduce the need for new regional traffic
facilities.
For transit to best serve the needs of City residents and reduce the impacts of
travel on neighborhoods, the Regional Transit System should be designed to
serve as an alternate to the automobile system. Transit should not be viewed
simply as a method of reducing peak hour, work trip, congestion on the
automobile network but should serve as a wide range of trip types. Such a
system will require the integration of inter-regional bus, air and rail service with
a regional system which is supported by high-quality local service, taxis and
special transportation services.
North Portland Policies
The basic objective e for North Portland is to route industrial-related traffic and
residential through traffic along the northern edge of the residential area.
Additionally, increased transit service on Lombard and to the industrial areas,
increased ride sharing and flexible working hours shall be encouraged in order
to relieve traffic congestion and reinforce neighborhood commercial services.
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Continued improvement of transit service linking North Portland to areas other
than the downtown, especially surrounding industrial areas and Lloyd Center,
shall be encouraged.
Transit services within the District shall be encouraged, in order to provide
connections from North Portland neighborhoods (residential areas) to
downtown St. Johns, the Kenton and Linnton business districts and other
activity centers. '
Northeast Policies
Because there are few streets which can appropriately be classified as Major
City Traffic Streets within Northeast Portland, a basic objective shall be to
stabilize traffic volumes by emphasizing ride sharing, flexible working hours,
and transit service improvements in the Downtown, Lloyd Center, the
Hollywood Business District, and within Northeast neighborhoods. Through
automobile and truck traffic shall be encourage to bypass the area on the
Banfield Freeway, 1-205,1-5, and Columbia Blvd.
Southeast Policies
Through traffic from East Multnomah and Clackamas Counties shall be
encouraged to bypass the Southeast District via 1-205, the Banfield Freeway
and McLoughlin Boulevard. Modifications to Neighborhood Collector Streets
shall have the general objectives of maintaining or reducing current traffic
volumes, especially during peak periods when many of the trips are regional
trips, as well as improving intersections to allow left turns. Cross town transit
service should continue to be expanded and improved to provide service to
activity centers other than Downtown (Lloyd Center. Hollywood, etc.) Increased
ride sharing and flexible working hours shall also be encouraged.
Southwest Policies
Residential and commercial growth in suburban areas has resulted in
increased traffic columns on Southwest District streets. This through traffic shall
be encouraged to travel around residential areas and emphasis shall be placed
on improving public transportation services within existing corridors to provide
an alternative to travel by automobile in peak and off-peak periods. Increased
ride sharing and flexible working hours shall also be encouraged.
Transit service improvements shall be encouraged to better serve trips within
the district, particularly trips between residential areas and commercial centers.
Because of the regional significance of the University of Oregon Health
Sciences University complex, limited or express transit service from Major
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Transfer points would be appropriate, but additional rights-of way acquisition for
transit would be inappropriate.
Northwest Policies
The major objective in Northwest Portland is to route non-local and industrial
traffic around residential areas and to encourage continued and increasing
reliance on public transportation, ride sharing, and flexible working hours.
As future residential development occurs adjacent to Forest Park, it should be
developed to encourage a high level of transit utilization in order to minimize
the impact of future commuter traffic on streets in the Northwest District.
Central Citv Plan
General Objectives
Continued increases in transit service to handle growth.
a. Light Rail Transit (LRT) transit corridors as spines for the higher density
development.
b. An expanded role for transit (LRT and vintage trolley) for shopping and
special events access,
c. Development of a specialized transit circulation system to serve all the
Central City districts.
Transit (vintage trolley, water taxi) as an adjunct to increased recreational use of
the Central City.
Transit-related Action Items
GH1 Develop a light rail and vintage trolley connection between the Civic
Stadium and Morrison Park east and west.
T2 Engineer and construct the Westside light rail line.
T3 Plan and construct the remaining portions of the regional light rail
system. (6-20 years) -
T4 Plan and construct an inner-city transit loop (possibly on Grand Avenue)
NW1 Establish a loop vintage trolley/light rail line which links Union Station,
Fremont Place, and the 13th Ave. Historic District (not PDOT).
ED7 Extend the vintage trolley and light rail system to link the Central City with
Portland's commercial, high density housing and recreational areas and
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attractions outside the Central City.
T11 Reinforce the Union Station area as a transportation center.
NB2 Extend the Transit Mall north on 5th and 6th to Union Station (not PDOT).






Metro Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation
Subcommittee on Metro/Tri-Met Merger
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5398
RE: ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS FOR PROVIDING TRANSIT SERVICES
We as a region are presently analyzing various future organizational
structures for providing transit services. The discussions come at an
exciting time as we enjoy the success of the eastside MAX and as we look
forward to the extension of MAX to other areas in the region.
To date, discussions have focused on the future roles of Tri-Met and those
of Metro in providing "traditional" transit services. However, perhaps
these discussions should go further to also explore the best method for
providing "non-traditional" transit services. These non-traditional
services respond to the unique travel demands of suburban residents and
may, upon further study, be best provided by local governments or more
localized transit authorities.
A recent study performed jointly by Tri-Met and Metro entitled Suburban
Transit Study, April 1989, suggests the need to go well beyond the
provision of conventional transit services in order attract a largely
untapped suburban transit market whose travel demands are different than
the current market being served. The study, prepared with the assistance
of Crain & Associates and JLM Consulting, comprehensively analyzed the
suburban transit market in Washington County and provided interesting
insight into the range of services that would be most successful in
meeting this County's future transit needs. In my view, the findings are
significant and should be considered in the evolution of future transit
services.
To begin with, the study concluded that "Tri-Met presently does an
excellent job serving work trips between Washington County and downtown
Portland, capturing 25% of all trips. In contrast, the study indicated
that Tri-Met carries a very low share of work trips that occur entirely
within Washington County. Only 0.9% of these trips are made by transit
and that there would appear to be considerable potential for tapping the
intra-suburban work trip market."
99
Beard oi County Commissioners.




"Another major travel market in Washington County are shopping, personal
business, and recreation trips. Trips made entirely within the county are
more numerous in this category than work trips. However, transit has an
even smaller share of this market. Only 0.6% of these trips are made by
transit, indicating that this market is also largely untapped."
The study further indicates that "while transit is operated reasonably
effectively in Washington County, route coverage falls short of what is
needed to serve the growing number of suburban office park locations.
One-third of the County's office park employment sites are not accessible
by transit. There are also several residential areas in the developed
area of the County which are not well served by transit. The gaps in
employment and residential coverage call into question the effectiveness
of transit in fully serving the developed portion of Washington County,
and suggest that there is an opportunity for reaching a larger and broader
transit market."
The second focus of the study was to evaluate alternative service methods
that will be most useful in serving areas that are presently unserved and
which feature low density populations or employment levels, areas where
Tri-Met service is unproductive, and special markets where a different
type of service is needed to attract new transit riders.
After evaluating various transit service methods, the study indicated that
"contracted small buses can best be used on fixed routes where Tri-Met
service productivity is low. Contracting with private providers offers
the greatest opportunity for cost saving, irrespective of a change in
service type. In addition, Dial-a:Ride can be used in low density areas
where fixed route transit would be too costly to operate, and as a
supplement to fixed route transit to serve specialized markets."
The study also notes that "the opportunity to improve service availability
and the financial performance of its suburban transit service by
contracting for service has significant labor implications. Given this
study and-the desire of Washington County to improve transit ridership, we
believe that as an alternative to the Metro/Tri-Met consolidation review,
consideration should be given to the possibility of Local Transit
Authorities under a County authority or a county-wide service district. A
County or county-wide special district may provide not only service





available to Metro or Tri-Met alone or as a consolidated agency. This
alternative is presented in the spirit of Commissioner Earl Blumenauer's
guideline that this subcommittee should look at what is in the best
interest of Transit for the region.
In conclusion, I feel it is important to further analyze the Suburban
Transit Study findings and to include their consideration in future
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SUBJECT: Organizational Approaches To Transit Governance
Summary Of Findings
Over the past month we have conducted an extensive review of the
experience around the county with transit governance. At the
suggestion of the JPACT Sub-committee we looked at three
successful innovative structures: Los Angeles, Miami, and
Minneapolis-St. Paul. We also looked at the experience of the
three elected transit boards in the nation: Denver RTD, Oakland
A-C Transit, and San Francisco BART. Other studies included a
review of the forces leading to a change in transit structure and
the relationship between transit performance and structure. A
copy of each of those individual analysis is attached.
Overall our findings can be summarized as follows:
What conditions lead to structural change?
Organizational change has come in response to a series of
problems - - financial crisis, disaffection of the suburbs over
lack of service, accountability, crisis of confidence over a
transit board's ability to do its job, or a lack of progress
toward building a rail system. Tri-Met no longer fits that
profile, nor did we attempt to turn the equation around and look
for problems at Metro that would be solved by merging with Tri-
Met.
What movement do we see toward a "model" of transit governance?
We found "no magic1* approach to transit governance that delivers
more accountability or better results. Each approach tends to be
an outgrowth of larger forces at work in the community with its
own set of pluses and minuses. In other words, there is not





What is the experience elsewhere with regard to the location of
policy-making and operation?
We did find an evolving national trend toward separating policy
setting from transit operations. The current situation where
Metro and JPACT set transportation policy and Tri-Met implements
it is consistent with this trend. This separation can also be
found throughout Canada and with San Diego MTDB, Los Angeles,
LACTC, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Chicago RTA, and New York MTA.
What happens when existing organiztional arrangements are
altered?
A side effect of changes in governance has been a loss of
momentum and an interruption in progress. The process of
"working out the details" has consumed considerable senior level
energy in each city we talked to. As a consequence other things
suffered. In Los Angeles, Denver, and Minneapolis-St. Paul the
journey to organizational change has been marked by approximately
a decade of in-fighting and turf wars. In Denver the shift from
an appointed to an elected transit board resulted in years of
indecision by RTD on whether or not to proceed with a regional
LRT system.
How prevalent are elected boards?
Elected transit boards are the exception to the rule nationally.
Out of over 3 00 transit agencies in the nation only three have,
elected boards. A fundamental problem with elected transit
boards has been establishing high enough visability with voters
to attract and retain quality members. This has been a problem
with BART, A-C Transit, and Denver's RTD.
Is there a relationship between structure and operational
efficiency?
Special authorities have been found to be more efficient than
transit managed by general purpose governments. Contrary to the
expectations of researchers at the Institute For Transportation
Studies University of California Irvine), transit systems managed
by special authorities like Tri-Met are more efficient than






What structures call forth strong transportation leadership?
Changes in governance did not create leadership. Structure seems
to be largely a consequence of the local political dynamic in
each region. Achieving results on the other hand seems to be a
consequence of funding(Los Angeles, San Diego, Miami), individual
leadership (San Diego) more than structure, and the magnitude of
the problem (Los Angeles).
What structures help achieve regional transportation concensus?
A move to elected transit boards has tended to shift regional
consensus. In both Denver and San Francisco their newly elected
boards has a tendency to see themselves as independent of other
governments because they were elected. Their agendas were
described to be at odds with other governments. In each case the
shift to an elected board resulted in a deterioration in their
relationship with other governments.
As is true with architecture in issues related to governance,
success can be achieved when form follows function. The lesson
from our analysis seems to be that the form you end up with needs
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DATE: Sept. 17, 1990
TO: Bob Post
FROM: G.B. Arrington -^  >
SUBJECT: Experience With Elected Transit Boards
The proposal for a Tri-Met/Metro merger centers on the
proposition that an elected transit board is inherently better
than an appointed board. A direct link with voters, supporters
argue, brings more accountability and that translates into a
better chance of securing more tax support. A review of the
experience nationally provides a context to evaluate whether the
philosophical expectations have played out in reality.
«
Elected transit boards are the exception to the rule nationally.
Out of over 300 transit agencies in the nation only three have





There is a lot of anecdotal evidence in the transit industry
about the problems with elected boards. That may be because they
are the exception to the norm or it may have more to do with each
local situation. Whatever the reason, the history of elected
transit boards is at best a mixed bag.
Denver Case Study
Of the three elected transit boards nationally, Denver's
experience is probably the most analogous to Portlands.
Portland and Denver both:
o created regional transit districts with appointed
boards in 1969;
o implemented successful downtown transit malls;
o restructured bus routes to create a grid system;
o were the focus of considerable public scrutiny and
controversy in the early 1980's? and,
o have similar expectations for building a regional light
rail system dating back to the mid-1970"s.
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In both systems the implementation of a grid system coincided
with considerable fireworks. Tri-Met's service expansion and
restructuring in 1982 led to service cuts, ridership losses, and
an erosion of public support when we "zigged instead of zagged."
In Denver citizen disaffection with their re-routing scheme"
mired RTD in scandal,11 according to DENVER POST Transportation
writer Gary Dehlson. That controversy coupled with a lack of
progress toward a regional LRT system lead Denver voters in 1980
to defeat a 1 cent sales tax for LRT and to approve a referendum
that threw out the appointed RTD Board and mandated an elected
board.
Denver's elected board took over in January, 1983. As Table One
shows experimentation with transit governance in Denver has not
ended with the creation of an elected board. Dissatisfaction
with progress by the elected RTD Board toward building LRT was a
factor in leading the legislature to create a separate Transit
Construction Authority (TCA) in 1987 to plan, finance, build, and
operate LRT. The seven member appointed TCA board which included
some of the best connected business leaders in Denver started
work in earnest on LRT. In 1988 progress again bogged down when
the TCA and the RTD submitted competing light rail proposals to
UMTA for alternatives analysis. For now, rail planning is again
the responsibility of the RTD. The TCA submitted its final
report in 1989 and quietly went out of business when it was not
re-authorized by the legislature.
In Denver one of the consequences of an elected board has been a
high turnover of board members and executive staff, according to
a recent Denver general manager. He characterized his primary
function to protect the board from its self. "No one knew who
they were when they got elected and they fought with each other
all the time once they got here." He believes that only two of
the seven Denver Board members are running for reelection. "They
are frustrated because they cannot get anything done."
The Colorado legislature is now considering various governance
alternatives for how to deal with Denver's transportation future.
Among the choices getting serious consideration is changing
Denver's Board back to an appointed one in order to attract and
retain quality board members. The political issue is whether the
legislature wants to give that power to the governor. Stay
tuned.
AC Transit
The Alameda-Costa County Transit District in Oakland has a seven
member elected board of directors. In the fertile political
climate of the San Francisco Bay area both the AC Transit and
BART boards historically have been characterized by local
observers as "low visibility, and hence a low priority with
voters."
The AC Transit board's low profile made re-election easy, which
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led to stagnation, a decline in service quality, a full fledged
scandal, and finally, the criminal indictment and forced
resignation of a majority of the board. In late 1987 AC Transit
employees and concerned citizens blew the whistle and went to the
grand jury to complain about improper use of public funds and
mismanagement by the board. The district was teetering on the
proverbial financial brink of ruin (cash reserves had declined
from $35 million to $3 million) causing the quality of transit
service on the street to deteriorate.
The scandal broke with the grand jury accusing the board of being
asleep at the switch and the criminal indictment of five of the
seven board members for mismanagement and misuse of public funds.
By the spring of 1983 four of the board members were forced to
resign and a new management team was put into place. The
surviving indicted beard member is up for elected this year.
San Francisco BART
Of the three elected transit boards, BART's situation is the
least analogous to Tri-Met, given .their narrow scope of
responsibilities. In 1974 BART changed from an appointed to an
elected board. By all accounts BART was able to attract high
quality members to its initial elected boards. Then, according
to a former BART executive "They got frustrated with the petty
politics, dropped out, and did not run."
A major consequence in the shift from an appointed to an elected
board was a deterioration in BART's relationship with other Bay
Area governments. "The board has a tendency to see themselves as
independent of ether agencies because they are elected. They do
not network well and therefore don't get the support of other
agencies." As for their internal workings, "The BART Board has
not been effective in providing leadership. They are very
fragmented and tend to operate through vote trading to advance
individual agendas. There is no cooperative board vision."
Conclusion
Denver's elected board has been unable to provide the leadership
to secure transit, finance or move closer to building a light rail
system. Lack of progress by the Board moved the Colorado
legislature to create a separate Transit Construction Authority
with an appointed board to plan, finance, and build light rail.
In terms of accountability, the presence of elected boards has
politicized the process of adjusting service and setting fares
for each of the three systems. Transit professionals complain
that the boards are either preoccupied with avoiding controversy
that could effect their election chances or taking very high
profile positions in opposition to each other and their
government partners.
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In Oakland the elected board was accused of being asleep at the
switch by the grand jury when they oversaw the near financial
ruin of the district and deterioration of transit service.
The criminal indictment and forced removal of a majority of
Oakland's board for misuse of public funds is probably an extreme
example. It does highlight the fundamental problem of creating
enough visibility for a transit board to attract quality members,
peak voter's interest, and maintain accountability. This is a
consistent problem mentioned by professionals who work with all
of the elected boards.
While the philosophical expectations for elected transit beards
are high, the experience in Denver and Oakland is far from
encouraging.
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o 21 member board appointed by local government
o Voters approved a 1/2 cent sales tax geared to a
100 mile fixed gaideway system
o Free fares off-peak for 1 month to promote
ridership
o Grid system/massive bus re-routing implemented
o Construction starts on bus mall
o RTD "mired in scandal11 over citizen disaffection
with bus re-routing
o Voters reject 1 cent sales tax for regional light
rail system
o Voter referendum threw out appointed board,
mandates elected board
o Legislature works out mechanics of elected board
o Four week transit strike
o 77 mile LRT plan approved by appointed RTD Board
o Election of new RTD Board
o 15 member elected board sworn in
o Lack of progress on LRT by RTD Board leads
legislature to create separate transit
construction authority (TCA)
o TCA seven member board appointed
o TCA starts work to plan, finance, and operate 18
mile LRT line
o TCA and RTD submit competing rail proposals to
UMTA
o TCA releases final report, not re-authorized by
legislature, goes out of business
o RTD planning for rail continues
o Legislature considering governance options for
Denver's transportation future including giving




DATE: Sept. 17, 1990
TO: Bob Post y^
FROM: G.B. Arringtori^ ^
SUBJECT: Organizational Fora and Transit Performance
The organizational form of transit agencies has been shown to
effect their performance. The most definitive look at the
relationship between performance and structure is "the 1984 study
Organizational Form And Transit Performance: A Research Review
And Empirical Analysis conducted by James L. Perry of the
Graduate School of Management and Institute of Transportation
Studies, University of California Irvine.
The Perry study is part of a flurry of UMTA sponsored research
during their push for privatization. In comparing transit agency
performance, one of Perry's four research hypothesis was that
publicly-managed general government transit (the Metro model)
will be more efficient than will public-managed transit under
special authorities (the Tri-Met model). That did not turn out
to be the case:
"We found that subsidized private systems are more cost
efficient than most public systems, except publicly-managed
special authorities. Contrary to our expectations, we found
that public agencies owned by general governments were less
efficient than special authorities."
The analysis covered 249 transit agencies and utilized UMTA
Section 15 Report information as the data base. That represents
about 95% of all fixed-route bus systems in the U.S. The
methodology involved an analysis of 25 indicators to measure
three performance concepts, cost efficiency, cost effectiveness
and service effectiveness.
Tri-Met Vs. AC Transit
A 1988 analysis by Santa Clara County Transit, Annual Update Of
Performance Comparison Of Santa Clara County Transit And Six
Comparable Transit Properties provides a poignant, independent
picture of the performance of Tri-Met versus one of the nation's
three elected transit beards, AC-Transit.
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Tri-Met outperformed AC-Transit in every comparison of both key
performance measures and in tracking performance over time (1984
to 1988). The Santa Clara study compared operating cost per
hour, operating cost per bearding rider, total rides per revenue
hour, total scheduled miles between mechanical road calls, and
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DATE: September 17, 1990
TO: Bob Pest
FROM: G.B. Arringtojrf^^
SUBJECT: Tri-Met Metro Merger - A National Context
Change in transit governance has been a continuous evolutionary
process nationally since the move from private operators to
regional transit agencies in the late sixties and early seventies.
The purpose of this memorandum is to review what's" happened, look
at the prevailing underlying reasons for change, and to speculate
a bit about what that portends for Tri-Met.
Historical context - 3 generations of change
The transit industry has been criticized from time to time for
being slow to evolve into new more efficient organizations. In
light of that, it is interesting to see the degree of change that
has occurred in response to unpredictable funding, shifting
demographics and travel markets, and political expectations for
transit to play an expanded role in addressing urban mobility.
The transit industry has witnessed three recent generations of
restructuring in response to a range of pressures. The first
generation of change occurred with the shift from multiple private
operators to regional transit agencies like Tri-Met. Second
generation restructuring occurred in the mid-70"s with the creation
of separata regional funding and oversight agencies like the Los
Angeles County Transportation Commission (IACTC). By in large,
these agencies did not become operators of transit service.
A possible Tri-Met Metro merger is part of the third generation of
reorganization now underway. The forces behind this change include
a broad range of issues including the desire to build regional rail
facilities, secure new taxes, increase service brokering and
coordination, and achieve better transportation and land use
integration.
Note: Much cf the information in this memorandum is drawn from
Transportation Research Board Special Report 217: Organizational





A primary objective of many of these third generational changes is
the desire to separate responsibility for policy making from that
of operations management. This is seen as a logical precondition
to thinking more broadly about the appropriate role of transit.
The separation of policy from operations has been identified as an
emerging trend in the United States. On the other hand, it is mere
common in Canada. Throughout Canada, policy boards set policy
standards (i.e., define the regional transportation plan including
transit service objectives and performance criteria), and the
transit boards implement them (annual service plan and service
delivery). For the Portland situation that would imply a
continuation of the current situation where JPACT and Metro set
transportation policy and Tri-Met carries it out.
Chance: A Response to Solve Problems
In each of the three generational restructuring, change has
occurred in response to a combination of fiscal, ridership,
service, and management issues. The prevalent motivation for a
change in governance has been to solve a problem.
Financial concerns seem to be the most common cause of externally
directed organizational change. Funding crises for the transit
operator (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Dallas) or the desire to plan,
finance, construct, and operate a rail system are recccurring
themes (San Diego MTDB, Los Angeles LACTC). Suburban
dissatisfaction with the level and quality of their transit service
versus the central cities has also been an underlying fores for
change (Chicago RTA, Minneapolis-St. Paul RTB). The other
prevalent factor has been a crisis of confidence over the ability
of the transit operator to do its job (Denver RTD, Minneapolis-St.
Paul RTB).
Some agencies have taken the initiative in redirecting their
mission or redesigning themselves in response to change. Tri-Met
is often included in this category. In Washington, DC (WMATA),
change meant refocusing attention on areas of traditional strength.
After focusing on the construction of its subway system, WMATA
selectively withdrew from suburban markets to concentrate its
resources on its traditional inter-city market. Boston (MBTA) and
Pittsburgh (PAT) are examples of agencies where cost controls and
increased productivity came from self-directed change.
Hostile Takeover Model: Minnearolis-St. Paul
Minneapolis-St. Paul is often pointed to as the classic example of
establishing a new oversight and policy-setting agency over the





the conditions that might warrant a change in governance --
financial crisis, disaffected suburbs,- crisis of confidence, and a
lack of progress toward LRT. In response to that, in 1984 the
legislature established a transit planning structure that is unique
in the U.S. The legislature limited MTC (the transit operator) to
transit operations and short-term planning while allowing the
region's MFO, the Metropolitan Council, to continue long-range
transit planning and policy setting. In addition, a third agency,
the Regional Transit Board (RTB) was established to conduct mid-
range planning, implement policies and plans of the Metropolitan
Council, and arrange for transit services.
The RTB's first policy issue was LRT. The region's desire to
implement LRT actually predates Portland's. Planning for LRT under
the new structure began in 1984 and consumed an extensive amount of
the RTB's attention. Concerned about the desirability of LRT and
the RTB's attention to it, the 1985 legislature prohibited
additional RTB study of LRT until a full assessment of the region's
transit needs was completed. In 1987 the legislature gave the
primary authority for rail planning to 7 separate rail authorities
established by counties. .
According to the Minnesota office of the legislative auditor, the
creation of RTB was a bold legislative experiment in response to a
series of problems. The RTB's overall record to date is mixed. It
has improved the region's transit service planning, and has given
greater attention to the cost-effectiveness of transit service.
The RTB has not proven to be an effective problem solver, so it is
unclear whether the 1984 experiment has been a success.
Conclusions
National experience provides a useful framework to put the Metro
merger proposal into context. A couple of dominate themes or
thresholds emerge from this analysis which help answer the
question:
Based on what's happened around the country, is a change in
transit governance warranted in Portland?
Those dominate themes can be simply stated as follows:
1. Organizational change nationally has been in response to
a series of problems — financial crisis, disaffection of
the suburbs over the lack of service, a crisis of
confidence ever the transit board's capability to do






Tri-Met no longer fits the profile of a transit agency facing a
series of problems to the extent that organizational change is
warranted. Five years ago that may have been the case. Today,
however, the Metro merger proposal is a bit of a solution in search
of a problem. Some outside observers note that Tri-Metfs lack of
big problems, its financial stability, light rail projects and an
all-time high level of public support make it an especially
attractive target for a hostile Metro takeover.
2. An emerging national trend organizationally is the desire
to separate responsibility for policy-making from that
for transit operations. Los Angeles (LACTC), New York
(MTA) , and Minneapolis-St. Paul (RTB) are some notable
examples. This is also consistent with what has been the
case for some time in Canada.
A Tri-Met takeover would be inconsistent with the trend to separate
policy from operations. The current situation where JPACT and
Metro set transportation policy and Tri-Met carries out the transit
piece is consistent with the latest thinking on organization








DATE: S e p t . 1 7 , 1990
TO: Bob P o s t ~
FROM: G.B. Arringtorfv* >^
SUBJECT: Tri-Met's Metro Merger: Status Of Research
National experience provides a useful framework to put the
question of a Tri-Met Metro merger into context. The attached
memorandums attempt to look at the issue from three different
perspectives:
1. What has been the experience with the three transit
boards in the country that are elected;
2. What were the prevalent causes of organizational change
in the transit industry; and,
3. How does organizational form impact transit
performance?
The conclusions from the three attached memorandums can be
summarized as follows:
1. In terms of elected boards, while the philosophical
expectations are high, the experience in Denver, San
Francisco, and Oakland is far from encouraging. The Denver
Board, for example, has not been able to provide leadership
to secure transit finance or move closer to building a LRT
system.
There is a consistent problem in creating enough viability
for an elected board to attract quality members, keep
voter's interest, and maintain accountability. The criminal
indictment and forced removal of a majority of the Oakland
Board for the misuse of public funds was a consequence of
their low profile with voters.
2. Organizational change has come in response to a series of
problems - - financial crisis, disaffection of the suburbs
over lack of service, crisis of confidence over a transit
board's ability to do its job, or a lack cf progress toward
building a rail system. Tri-Met no longer fits the profile
of an agency in need of a white knight to take us ever and
set things right.
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The current situation of Metro and JPACT setting
transportation policy and Tri-Met implementing the transit
piece is consistent with an emerging national trend to
separate policy setting from operations.
3. Contrary to the expectations of researchers at the Institute
For Transportation Studies (University of California
Irvine), transit systems managed by special authorities like
Tri-Met are more efficient than transit systems managed
under general governmental systems like Metro.
The California study locked at 249 transit agencies and used
UMTA Section 15 data to compare 25 separate indicators in




- Experience With Elected Transit Boards
- Tri-Met Metro Merger: A National Context







DATE: 4 October 1990
TO: G.B. Arrington
FROM: Dan Hoyt
SUBJECT: Minneapolis Planning Structure
Introduction
The Twin Cities has a three tiered planning structure.
Attachment 1 is a summary of the functions of the three main
tiers of organization structure. The three organizations are the
Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC) which operates the buses,
the Metropolitan (MET) Council which is a regional policy setting
body, and the Regional Transit Board (RTB) which implements the
MET Council's policies. Attachment 2 has a description of these
organizations as found in the RTB 1989 Annual Report.
In 1984 the Minnesota legislature created the RTB, thus a three
tiered transit planning structure. Other than political
maneuvering, the RTB was created for the following reasons:
a) a transit funding crisis;
b) two studies recommending structural separation of service
planning from operations.
c) a history of regional government which separated policy
making from operations;
d) a reluctance to involve the MET Council in system detail;
e) a poor working relationship between the MTC and the MET
Council, as well as legislative dissatisfaction with the
MTC's chair; and,
f) municipal officials concerned that transit service in their







Following a slow start and a poor performance audit, the state
legislature discussed abolishing the RTB. As the region became
more desirous of light rail and frustrated with RTB, the state
legislature limited the power of RTB and gave counties the
authority to pursue rail independently, resulting in seven county
rail boards studying a dozen rail lines. The state is also
looking at ways to increase the involvement of the state
department of transportation. In addition, the MET Council is
taking on some management functions to "get closer to the
problems their policies are intended to resolve."
A review of the above and of the attachments illuminates the
opaque lines of responsibility among these organizations.
Because of this complex structure, it is not surprising that
interagency coordination, accountability and communication have
suffered. Specific problems include:
a) confusion over sponsorship of public hearings;
b) impracticalities of managing contracts without operating
responsibility;
c) impracticalities of designing and implementing programs
without operating responsibility;
d) difficulty balancing policy leadership with prudent
management;
e) lack of diligence by the MET Council in its oversight of RTB
actions;
f) stagnation in leadership, innovation, and public discussion
of new ideas; and,
g) delays' and confusion related to light rail planning.
Conclusion
The addition of the RTB to the Twin Cities' planning structure,
between the regional policy-setting body (the Met Council) and
the transit operator (MTC) is the most recent attempt to address
a host of local transportation issues in the area.
From my reading and a telephone conversation with a member of the
MET Council staff, it seems clear that a complex organizational
planning structure has evolved in the Twin Cities as a result of.





The region is "struggling with its identity and various power
grabs," and as a result transit service may be suffering. With
respect to light rail, leadership appears to be emerging at the
county level, not as a result of the planning structure but
because that is where the individuals with leadership abilities
are found.
The RTB's track record has been described as containing many
mistakes and missed opportunities. With the addition of light
rail planning efforts in the region, RTB's abilities are
receiving increased scrutiny and regional planning has become
more chaotic and fractionalized.
Finally, the point was made that whatever organizational changes
are made they will trigger political adjustments. All these
changes require a great deal of time (years) to settle before the
desired program or service adjustment come about. Thus,
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Attachment 1
Minneapolis Transit Planning Structure
Metropolitan Transit
Commission
3 members appointed by RTB
Transit operations
Short term planning
Created by the legislature
in 1967, charged with
developing a comprehensive
plan for Twin Cities Transit
Acquired the area's largest
bus company in 1970
ho
Metropolitan Council













• 11 member board1
• Mid-range planning
• Metropolitan Council policy
implementation
• Accountable to the Metro
Council
• Created by the legislature in
1984 to more closely link
planning tolocal needs
• Joint Light Rail Transit
Committee 2— an advisory
body
Aside from the three agencies noted, the RTB contracts with two administrative agencies
and has established four separate advisory committees. Also, the state legislature gave
primary responsibility for light rail planning to rail authorities established by
counties. (There are seven counties in the metropolitan area.)
Created as a 15 member board; restructured twice to nine, and now 11 members.
Metro Council appoints eight members, six are local elected officials. The Governor
appoints three members - the chair, a disabled, and a senior citizen.
The
This is being viewed as an emerging fourth tier of the planning in the region.
Attachment 2
PURPOSE AND NATURE OF ORGANIZATION
The Regional Transit Board (RTB)
The RTB directs, coordinates, and prioritizes transit services in
the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area through needs assessment,
policy development, distribution of public funds, facilitation of
the implementation of programs and research, and demonstration
projects. This is accomplished within the direction of the
Legislature and the long-range transportation policy planning
role of the MET Council. The RTB facilitates the implementation
of transit service programs recognizing the transit operating
role of the MET Transit Commission and other transit service
providers, and the need for continuous involvement of local units
of government and the public.
It is the opinion of the RTB that it is neither a component unit
of the MET Council nor is the Metropolitan Transit Commission a
component unit of RTB.
Metropolitan (MET) Council
The MET Council selects RTB board members but not its management-
The MET Council has only limited authority over RTB budgets and
no authority over its contracts, hiring, properties, or in
resolving matters affecting recipients of RTB services. The
geographic area and populations served by both entities are
substantially the same. However, the MET Council does not
provide funding to RTB, nor does it have responsibility for
funding any RTB deficits or guaranteeing any RTB debt, nor can it
use the RTB fund balances.
The RTB authorities, funding sources, and functions over which
the Council has limited or no oversight responsibility lead to
the conclusion that the RTB is not a component unit of the
Council.
Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC)
The RTB selects commission members of the MTC but cannot
designate its management. RTB reviews and approves MTC budgets
but does not approve its outside contracts, control its
properties, or resolve matters affecting recipients of MTC
services. The RTB is not required to fund any MTC operating
deficit. The MTC may pledge the taxing power of the RTB only
with approval of the RTB and only for a one-year period for any
issue of debt. RTB's geographic service area is larger than that
of MTC, and includes significant areas served by other transit
providers.
While a number of the MTC authorities, funding sources, and
functions are dependent on the RTB, the significance of those




DATE: 4 October 1990
TO: G.B. Arrington
FROM: Dan Hoyt
SUBJECT: Los Angeles Planning Structure
Introduction
Los Angeles has a two tiered planning structure. The Los Angeles
County Transportation Commission (LACTC) and the Southern
California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) are responsible for
transportation funding/planning and transit operations,
respectively. The relationship between these two agencies was
described to me as strained and characterized by "turf wars."
SCRTD was created by the state in the mid 1960s as the regional
transit agency. SCRTD operates most of the bus service in the
area, as well as the light rail line, making it one of the
nation's largest transit systems with over 2,700 vehicles.
In 1976 California law created the LACTC as an overall funding
and coordinating agency for public transit and highways in the
County. LACTC was given broad, although somewhat nonspecific,
powers to improve the transportation decision making process in
the county. The LACTC is an "umbrella" organization which
oversees programming of capital and operating funds, and monitors
SCRTD operations.
In sum, the reason given for creating the LACTC, above political
maneuvering, include:
a) the need for better overall transportation planning;
b) a lack of confidence in SCRTD; and,
c) the need for transit to take a more prominent role.
In November 1980, county voters unexpectedly passed Proposition A
which established a half cent sales tax for countywide transit
projects. In fiscal 1988 this tax produced over $330 million.
Virtually ignored since its creation, LACTC was launched into a
position of power with the passage Proposition A. Proposition A
gave LACTC the purse strings, thus control over SCRTD. While
this allowed an ambitious rail program to proceed it allowed the
Commission to manipulate SCRTD—a temptation not resisted by
LACTC according to staff at SCRTD.
In November 1990, county voters will have a chance to increase
the sales tax to a full penny. This is estimated to generate an
additional $400 million annually for transit.
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Discussion
In each of the past four years legislation has been introduced to
reorganize, or realign, these two organizations. According to a
staff member with LACTC the two agencies have "bumped heads" from
the onset due to an overlap in perceived responsibilities. In
1990 a compromise measure was passed that directs the agency
boards to develop and approve a plan for consolidation, and
forward that plan to the legislature by January 1, 1992.
In the past year there has been adverse publicity on management
and budget problems at SCRTD and perceived conflict or lack of
coordination between SCRTD's metro rail construction activities
and LACTC's light rail program. In addition there has been local
dissatisfaction with SCRTD's efficiency, safety, and
responsiveness to the public and suburban jurisdictions.
Within the past year a Rail Construction Corporation (RCC) was
created to take over responsibility for building rail projects.
Plans call for over 400 miles of heavy and light rail in the next
ten to fifteen years. The RCC took over the METRO rail
construction from SCRTD and light rail construction from LACTC,
The RCC has a seven member board with three members appointed by
the RTB, three appointed by the LACTC, and one appointed by those
six individuals. The RCC is a subsiderary of LACTC. Some staff
at SCRTD believe the LACTC may be interested in taking on
operating responsibility for the rail lines in the future.
Attachment 1 contains a description of the board structures of
the two organizations. The boards contain overlapping membership
of elected and appointed individuals.
Conclusions
The state legislature created a two tiered planning structure in
L.A. when it created a higher level of government (LACTC) above
the regional transit operator (SCRTD). The situation has been
politically charged since LACTC's inception.
As a result of continued squabbles between LACTC and SCRTD, as
well as criticism of their performance, the two planning bodies
have been directed by the state legislature to consolidate their
efforts by January 1, 1992.
The creation of a Rail Construction Corporation has added another
layer to the transit structure which may be quelling promblems
between SCRTD and LACTC.
Thanks to a one half cent sales tax for transit, L.A. has been
able to undertake a massive rail program and operate the largest
bus system in the Country. It is not clear weather planning
structure can be credited with this success or the area's





* The five L.A. County Supervisors;
* The Mayor of L.A.;
* Two members appointed by the Mayor of L.A.—a member of
the City Council and traditionally, a private citizen;
* Two city council members appointed by the L.A. County
City Selection Committee to represent the other 84
cities in the county (in addition to L.A. and Long
Beach); and,
* The district director from caltrans also sits on the
board as a non-voting member.
SCRTD 11 Members
The five L.A. County Supervisors;
The Mayor of L.A.;
An appointee of the Mayor of L.A.;
Four member appointed by the County City Selection
Committee to represent the other 84 cities in the
county (in addition to L.A.
Elected officials are allowed to appoint alternates to carry out
their duties. As can be seen above at least six seats on each









SUBJECT: Transit Organization in Miami
Transit in Miami is operated as a department of Metro-Dade
County. This "super county" structure is unique in the county.
Metro-Dade provides general purpose government functions for the
1.7 million residents of the county. The county has 8
commissioners and a mayor. The commissioners must reside in
their district, but like the mayor, voting for each position is
countywide. Metro-Dade's home rule charter and $2 billion annual
budget make it a potent political power.
METRORAIL EXPERIENCE
The county's political clout together with the backing of Miami
Congressman Lehman (Chairman of the Transportation Appropriations
Committee) has made Miami very successful in securing funding for
major transit capital projects. Miami Metrorail, a two-legged
heavy rail line, and Metromover, a downtown people-mover are
notable examples. Local funding for Metrorail was part of a $132
million "Decade of Progress" property tax bond measure approved
by voters in 1972.
Critics of transit in Miami complain that they have spent a lot
of money building things, but have done very little toward
improving transit service levels in Miami. Implementation of
Metrorail was less than successful. Political considerations,
for example, kept duplicate bus and rail service on the street so
that minority riders would not be forced to transfer. Ridership
on the line was much lower than expected, while operating costs
vastly exceeded estimates.
In the face of large unanticipated Metrorail losses Metro-Dade
chose to maintain the high visibility rail service and cut costs
in other areas. Bus service was cut as well as some general






As one of many county departments transit is in direct
competition with other county services. Some $90 million of
transit's $162 million annual budget comes from county general
funds. Cutting police service to maintain rail service is one
dramatic example of the trade offs at work. Whether the choices
have gone the other way (transit cuts for police) is unclear.
A transit funding proposal on the November ballot highlights some
of the dynamics that can come to play in funding transit within a
general purpose government structure. Voters are being asked to
create a dedicated source of funds for transit by raising the
sales tax. The new tax would raise $100 million in its first
year. The proceeds allow for the improvement of transit service
and provide matching funds for extending downtown's Metromover.
However, the transit proposal is as much a shift in resources
within the county as a transit funding measure. Creation of a
dedicated source for transit would increase transit funding by
$10 million annually and free up all of the $90 million in county
general funds going to transit for other uses, including parks,
police, human services, public works, a trauma center, and a $45
million property tax debate.
CONCLUSION
Metro-Dade is a "super county" structure which incorporates a
board range of city and county general purpose responsibilities.
The transit department, for example, represents less than 10% of
Metro-Dade's $2 billion annual budget. That scale means that the
mayor and eight commissioners carry considerable political clout
which they can use on behalf of transit. Miami's Metrorail is a
good example. On the other hand, transit is only a small piece
of what they do so it has suffered because of the lack of an
advocate on the Board. Again Metrorail serves as an example.
Problems with costs, ridership, and feeder bus service for
Metrorail are a national example for how not do rail transit
successfully.
In terms of day to day functions, transit's status simply as a
department within Metro-Dade insulates it a bit from politics.
Transit policy decisions (fare, service adjustments, capital
plans) are all acted on by the Metro-Dade commissioners. A 1984
comparison of decision making by Metro-Dade and Atlanta's
appointed transit board of 17 elected officials from six
different political units found that Miami's decisions were
perceived to be less political than Atlanta's. Transit has
considerable political visibility in Miami, but does not seem to





The creation of a dedicated funding source for transit would
stabilize funding, increase service, and help build the downtown
Metromover. Some local transit professionals complain that the
transit benefits are negligible. What it really does, they
complain, is shift $90 million in general funds to a laundry list
of general purpose functions and increase transit funding in the
first year by only $10 million.
GBA:fh Pursuant to • Resolution No. R-162-90, adopted on
March 6,1990 by the Board of County Commissioners
of Dade County, Florida, and in accordance with
Section 100.342, Florida Statutes, notice is hereby
given of the special eiection to be held in Dade County
on Novembers, 1990.
The following question shall appear on the ballot:
DADE COUNTY TRANSIT SYSTEM SURTAX
Shall Dade County be authorized to: - -
,(1)levy an additional 1 % tax on transactions
subject to state taxes imposed on sales, use,
and other transactions; . - : - : • ; !
. (2) deposit the proceeds in a rapid transit trust
fund; and : ..
 ;. - V ; j /
(3) use the proceeds only for development,
construction, equipment maintenance,
operation, supportive services, including a
countywide bus system, and related costs of a
fixed guideway rapid transit system?
The polls at such special election shall be open from 7
a.m. until 7 p.m. on the day of the special election. All
qualified electors of Dade County, Florida shall be
eligible to vote YES or NO for this question.
This special election shall be held and conducted in
accordance with applicable provisions of general law
relating to special elections and the provisions of the
Dade County Home Rule Charter. *
David C. Leahy
Supervisor of Elections
- - - ™ — * ~ Dade-Coanty rFiorida
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9002 SE McLOUGHLIN, MILWAUKIE, OREGON 97222 PHONE 653-3090
October 25, 1990 F l R N o - R e < e r T o
David A. Mazza, Vice Chairman
Columbia Group
Sierra Club
2637 SW Water St.
Portland, OR 97201
Subject: Western Bypass Study
As we discussed, I have delayed responding to your letter to me dated July 30 and a
similar letter to Governor Goldschmidt on August 16 because I felt these issues warranted
an in-person discussion. Also, this has been a dynamic study process, and I wanted
further clarification from your Board on some of these issues. I would still like to meet
with your Board, but because there has been no room on your agenda to date, I felt it
appropriate to respond in writing to the concerns you raised in your letters.
1. Non-responsiveness of ODOT Staff
We also had concerns on potential implications of Mr. Bothman's interview as it
appeared in the Hillsboro Argus. However, Mr. Bothman was quick to clarify his
position in a letter to the editor and a letter to study committee members. These,
along with a cover letter from me, crossed your letter of July 23 in the mail. Your
follow-up letter of July 30 arrived while I was on vacation, and I did not have time
to respond before your letter of August 16 to Governor Goldschmidt.
Because of the importance of the issues and concerns you raised, I requested the
opportunity to meet directly with your executive board rather than attempting to
resolve these sensitive issues through the mail. The Oregon Department of
Transportation has actually responded at several levels. In addition to my efforts
and the letters of Mr. Bothman, Michael Hollera, Chairman of the Oregon
Transportation Commission, attended the last Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC)
Meeting to reiterate the Oregon Transportation Commission's commitment to a
broad and open study that looks at a full range of reasonable alternatives to a
bypass.
734-1850 (1-87)
David A. Mazza, Vice Chairman
October 25, 1990
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2. Bias of Study Committee Members
You have expressed concern that members of committees formed for this study are
biased toward a bypass and were selected based on this bias. Attached is a list of
members of the CAC which clearly shows a very broad representation of interests,
both within and outside the study area. We specifically avoided selecting members
based on their positions on a bypass, since this could unfairly bias the study.
Instead, we sought a balance of the key stakeholder groups and issues.
Representatives were selected after lengthy and numerous interviews based on their
ability to objectively evaluate technical information and make reasonable decisions
regardless of their personal feelings for, against, or indifferent to a bypass and
based on their ability to be effective liaisons with their constituents.
The Steering and Technical Committee memberships are comprised of jurisdictions
within the study area boundary and agencies with a direct jurisdictional interest in
the study. You requested that Clackamas and Multnomah counties and the City of
Portland be included on our committees. This issue was raised with the CAC for
their recommendation on expanding committee membership. Because of the number
of jurisdictions wishing to participate in this study, and particularly because all
jurisdictions mentioned participate through JPACT in the decision-making process
anyway, it was voted by majority not to recommend expansion of the committees.
I explored this further with Multnomah and Clackamas counties, and representatives
from both counties stated they preferred their representation through JPACT.
The boundary for committee membership was not arbitrarily drawn, but was drawn
to include those jurisdictions who are most affected by the results of this study and
to allow us to control the size of the committees. The offer was made to the City
of Portland to address our Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) to make a formal
request to participate on the study, but it is important that specific criteria be
established so that we can explain to other jurisdictions with an interest in the study
why the City of Portland was added.
You expressed a concern on the representation of the City of McMinnville on the
CAC. The City of McMinnville is not directly represented on any committee.
A member of the CAC lives in McMinnville but represents the Oregon Tourism
Alliance. The OTA includes Portland as well as cities and counties west of the
study area that have a major interest and concern in the outcome of this study,
much as your involvement for the broader Sierra Club interest.
David A. Mazza, Vice Chairman
October 25, 1990
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3. Resistance of the Study Team To Consider Any But Bypass Alternatives
The study committee is very committed to looking at reasonable alternatives to a
bypass. Clearly, a bypass will be considered as an alternative since the
recommendations from Metro to ODOT were to study a bypass facility. As we
have stated numerous times, we are also looking at alternatives to a bypass
including a more intensive transit system, improvements to the existing highway
network, and other means to reduce traffic demand. It has been suggested that we
also consider a land use alternative, and we have requested that this be better
defined so we can assess whether this is possible within the context of our study.
To date, we have received broad requests to consider other alternatives, but have
received no specifics on what they might be.
4. Concern That Regional and Land Use Planning Are Not Adequately Addressed
Through This Study
We clearly recognize that land use affects transportation and vice versa. These
issues will continue to be considerations in this study. However, it should be
remembered that this is not a broad regional, county, or city transportation plan,
but rather a specific implementation effort to respond to a specific request from
JPACT to look at the feasibility of a western bypass to address the transportation
needs in the southwest Portland metropolitan area.
The Regional Transportation Plan, developed through Metro with participation by
all regional jurisdictions, is responsible for regional transportation planning.
Likewise, all jurisdictions are responsible for development of land use plans that
are subsequently acknowledged by LCDC as being in compliance with state-wide
planning goals. A Regional Transportation Plan has been adopted by Metro, and
all jurisdictions in the study area have acknowledged land use plans that are the
basis for the study we are currently conducting.
Like several other transportation projects in the area, Western Bypass Study has
regional implications. These will be evaluated by JPACT at appropriate points in
the Study to address regional issues or concerns.
5. Replace The Study Steering Committee With JPACT
It has been the policy of JPACT and the State that implementation of projects
becomes the responsibility of the jurisdiction that is impacted once a project is
included in the RTP. JPACT is well represented on the Steering and Technical
Advisory committees. However, participation only by JPACT would eliminate some
substantial interests in this study—the majority of cities in the study area (one
David A. Mazza, Vice Chairman
October 25, 1990
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person represents all Washington County cities) and DLCD. It would also add
interests substantially outside the study area, such as Clark County and Washington
Department of Transportation.
6. Expand Citizens Advisory Committee Membership To Include Special Groups Such
As Physically Impaired Or Others With Special Transportation Needs
It is very important that the special needs of these groups be considered in
transportation planning. Input from these groups has guided the development of
transportation policies and design criteria at a state and regional level. These
policies and criteria as well as special local needs are then incorporated in the
actual design of a facility. The Western Bypass Study is not a broad policy study
(see #4) nor is it a design level study. However, we are sensitive to the needs of
these groups and will address any comments on special needs if they are raised
by any special interest group.
7. Expand Public Information on the Study
Within the last year, we have published four newsletters, held three open houses,
two public workshops, and six Citizens Advisory Committee meetings that are
advertised in the newspaper and are open to the public. We maintain a mailing
list of about 1,400 interested people who are sent regular information on the study.
Several local newspapers also run regular stories on the status of the bypass study
and we maintain a full-time public involvement coordinator to respond to individual
questions from the public. I am also available to speak to groups of any size and
interest to provide current information on the study. I have addressed an average
of two or three such groups a week.
It is the nature of this type of study that public interest is less active during
development of goals and objectives and evaluation criteria. If your concern is that
more public is not attending meetings, I expect this will change when our technical
analyses are completed and more controversial issues are discussed.
Again, I would emphasize that we are continually looking for ways to improve our
public involvement effort, and your specific recommendations that will make this
a better process are welcome.
8. Issue a New Mission Statement For the Study That States All Alternatives Will Be
Considered
Our current "Mission Statement" for the study already states that all reasonable
alternatives will be considered. As far as a land use alternative is concerned, we
David A. Mazza, Vice Chairman
October 25, 1990
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have requested 1000 Friends of Oregon to provide a definition of what such .an
alternative would look like. They have recommended a "land use" process that we
are now evaluating. In addition, we will provide an opportunity in this study for
local jurisdictions to reconsider land use allocations if they so desire.
I would like to clarify that no time has been lost in the study responding to the issues you
have raised. The issues you have raised are important, and we have attempted to deal
with them as best we can. At the same time, our consultants have continued to work
under their existing contract and schedule. Hopefully, we can continue to address issues
as they arise without impacting our long-term goals.
The Sierra Club provides an important perspective to the study we are currently
conducting, and we appreciate your interest and willingness to raise sensitive and difficult
issues. It would be a loss to the study for the Sierra Club to resign from the Citizens
Advisory Committee; however, we realize that you cannot participate in this study if you
do not feel it represents or responds to your concerns.
If you have further questions, or would like to discuss these issues further, I would be
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Governor Neil Goldschmidt
State Capitol Building . - .... •
Salem, Oregon 97301
Dear Governor Goldschmidt:
-The Sierra Club wishes to bring to your attention our concerns over
the handling of the Western Bypass Study, an Access Oregon project
-in which we are currently participating as citizens advisory
?
 committee environmental representative. We bring this matter to
you after receiving no response i-from the Oregon Department of
Transportation to our earlier Voiced reservations that the agency
is * "not committed to an impartial study of transportation
strategies/ and; in fact, is committed to a freeway alternative
regardless of the study's outcome. Evidence of this bias has
raised the question in the minds of the Club's 4700 members in the
metropolitan area and over-10,000 members in the state whether this
- is a ^project in which • our-organization should continue : to
p a r t i c i p a t e . - • --^ '"-•"••> .-••<-' -r:-: -'<- •• -•-•
 :.: ~ '-•• , ':- . ...-. -.
The Sierra Club came to the Western Bypass Study committed to
participating in an objective study of transportation problems and
needs in the southwestern metropolitan area as they related to the
regional transportation network and urban structure. Unfortunately,
the study process has been a source of disappointment and concern
from the start. The study team's selection of committee members
has resulted in overwhelming majorities on each committee of
individuals closely affiliated with earlier support of the Western
Bypass and totally lacking in the impartiality and regional vision
called for in the study's mission. The study team, in particular
Project Manager Michal Wert, has actively promoted discussions of
freeway dependent solutions,- while equally resisting efforts to
broach discussions of the other transportation alternatives called
for by the study. The study team has done little to facilitate
communication between the committees, or between members on a
particular committee. Efforts to involve certain local
jurisdictions immediately outside the arbitrarily drawn boundaries
of the study area, such as Portland,' have been strongly resisted
by the study team, while other outside, jurisdictions, those on
record as supporting the bypass alternative such as McMinnville,
have been given a voice in the process. Efforts to engage the
public inside the study area have been feeble while efforts to
engage taxpayers outside the area have been non-existent. Lastly,
Director Bob Bothman last month saw fit to declare the -western
bypass inevitable, over a year before his agency's study would be
completed. These are not the actions of an agency willing or
SIERRA CLUB
2637 S.W. Water Street-Portland. Oreaon 97201
capable of addressing regional problems .with regional solutions,
aimed at promoting regional well-being into the next century. •, i-
As already stated, all the above has been brought/to the
 vattention
of the Oregon Department of Transportation twice by the Sierra
Club, in an effort to salvage what is fast becoming a mockery of
regional transportation and land use planning, the Club requested
a number of steps be taken by the agency. To date, those requests
have not been addressed nor is there any indication of the agency fs
intent to do so in the future. Consequently,; the Club now turns
to you, requesting the following changes be made to the study
process.
1. Reorganize the study committees* membership to truly reflect
the regional nature of this project. Recent requests made by the
City of Portland, and rejected by the study team, clearly indicate
the current membership is not representative. The Club feels this
goal could most quickly and effectively be achieved by either
replacing or augmenting the strategy/steering committee with the
members of JPACT. This would give the structure both the
geographical and jurisdicational diversity now lacking and take the
study out of the hands of individuals who have-bankrupted their
credibility on this issue. .*•-•—.5* ~ ^ ^ : ^ <•-: ; ^ 1^;-
2. Augment the citizen advisory committee to include proportional
representation from the--entire metropolitan region, ^ aiming at a
similar mix of citizen, business and special interests.- Special
interests, in particular, should be expanded beyond the current
study definition to include such groups as the physically impaired
and others with special transportation needs.
3. Expand the public education elements of the study to include
residents throughout the metropolitan region. Equally important,
and totally lacking to date, organize these workshops in a fashion
which transmits usable and impartial information. Go beyond the
minimal efforts thus far and encourage these events by publicizing
them in the media and through other avenues, as well as holding
them at accessible locations (e.g. on bus lines).
4. Issue a new mission statement to the public stating that the
study shall consider all transportation alternatives, including
mass transit, land use reconfiguration, time management and varying
combinations, in addition to a freeway. The public statement
should also include a retraction of earlier statements by agency
personnel which have promoted in the public's mind the
inevitability of the western bypass.
As already stated, the Club feels the only chance of retrieving the
time lost due to the Oregon Department of Transportation's efforts
to undermine its own study is by instituting the above recommended
changes. Failure to take action will only further convince a broad
segment of the metropolitan area's population and organizations
representing various interests that the current Western Bypass
Study is incapable of producing a valid result. For the Sierra
Club, it will also mean that it will have to -reevaluate ^ its
committment to this process. The Club is -not willing to sacrifice>
the public trust it has won over the past, ninety eight years -of'
working for the environment, nor is it willing to lend unwarranted
credibility to a bankrupt process. The Club hopes that in view of
your past committment to progressive answers to urban problems/
especially those related to transportation, that you will give 1









Metropolitan Service District .
Portland City Council .::
Multriomah County Commissioners •
Clackamas County Commissioners .
Washington County Commissioners
Vera Katz, Speaker of the House
















U.S. Senator Bob Packwood
U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield
U.S. Representative Les AuCoin
U.S. Representative Ron Wyden
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